Let\u27s Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission by Werntz, Heidi
Pace Environmental Law Review 
Volume 28 
Issue 2 Winter 2011 Article 2 
January 2011 
Let's Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission 
Heidi Werntz 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr 
Recommended Citation 
Heidi Werntz, Let's Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission, 28 Pace Envtl. L. 
Rev. 421 (2011) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. 
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
02 WERNTZMACRO 3/23/2011 6:20 PM 
 
421 
ARTICLE 
 
Let’s Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for 
Merchant Transmission*
HEIDI WERNTZ
 
**
“[A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider application 
than the mischief which gave it birth.” – Louis D. Brandeis 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Transmission, which has long played a supporting role to the 
generation and sale of electricity, has now captured center stage.1  
Congress has directed the Secretary of Energy to conduct a 
nation-wide study of electricity transmission congestion and 
designate any area experiencing congestion that adversely affects 
customers as a national interest electric transmission corridor.2
 
* The author wishes to thank Justin Davidson, a second year law student at 
Pace University, for his thoughtful assistance researching this article. 
  
** Senior Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; A.B. Brown 
University; A.M. Yale University; J.D. Catholic University Columbus School of 
Law.  This article reflects the author’s views and not necessarily the views of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
 1. See, e.g., Jon Wellinghoff et al., Letter to the Editor, FERC is Doing the 
Right Thing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2011, at A16 (“[I]nvestment in transmission 
promotes efficient and competitive electricity markets, which hold down prices 
for consumers. Transmission investment also enhances reliability and allows 
access to new energy resources. . . . Our actions will assist regions that seek to 
modernize their electric infrastructure to better compete in the global 
economy.”); Matthew L. Wald, Wind Energy Bumps into Power Grid’s Limits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008, at A1; see also Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 
F.3d 470, 478 (7th Cir. 2009) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (“The United States is now 
engaged in an urgent project to upgrade its electric transmission grid, which for 
years has been generally regarded as inadequate.”). 
 2. 16 U.S.C. § 824(p)(a) (2006); see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL 
INTEREST ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONGESTION STUDY (2006), available at 
http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/Congestion_Study_2006-
10.3.pdf.  States generally site transmission facilities, but under certain limited 
circumstances, the FERC has backstop transmission siting authority in national 
interest electric transmission corridors. 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2006); see also 
1
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The Department of Energy has promised approximately $3.4 
billion dollars of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
20093 funding to various smart grid4 endeavors.5  Just this past 
year, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“Commission” 
or “FERC”) launched two groundbreaking transmission-related 
rulemaking proceedings, one on transmission planning and cost 
allocation, including for transmission projects that traverse 
several states or regions,6 and the other on integrating variable 
energy resources, such as wind and solar power, into the 
transmission grid.7
 
Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that FERC only has transmission siting authority when the state cannot act, 
fails to act in a timely manner, or acts inappropriately by granting a permit with 
unattainable conditions).  In addition, Congress directed FERC to adopt rules 
providing the opportunity to collect incentive-based transmission rates, 
including a return on equity that attracts investment in transmission, such as 
the deployment of new transmission technologies. 16 U.S.C. § 824(s) (2006); see 
also Debbie Swanstrom & Meredith M. Jolivert, DOE Transmission Corridor 
Designations and FERC Backstop Siting Authority: Has the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 Succeeded in Stimulating the Development of New Transmission 
Facilities?, 30 ENERGY L.J. 415, 459-60 (2009). 
  Further, the Commission has avidly 
 3. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009). 
 4. The term “smart grid” refers to the marriage of information technology 
and the electric system.  More precisely it means “combining time-based prices 
with the technologies that can be set by users to automatically control their use 
and self-production, lowering their power costs and offering other benefits such 
as increased reliability to the system as a whole.” PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART 
POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC 
UTILITIES 10 (2010). 
 5. See, e.g., DOE to Award Smart Grid Funds Today, ELEC. POWER DAILY, 
Oct. 27, 2009.  Congress appropriated $4.5 billion for DOE to modernize the 
transmission grid; $3.5 billion for Smart Grid Investment Grant Program. Dep’t 
of Energy, http://www.energy.gov/recovery/ smartgrid.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 
2011). 
 6. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning 
and Operating Public Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,884, 37,884 (proposed June 30, 
2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (proposing to amend transmission 
planning and cost allocation requirements to ensure that Commission-
jurisdictional services are provided in a just and reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential manner). 
 7. Integrating Variable Energy Resources, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,335 (proposed 
Dec. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430) (proposing to improve 
transmission scheduling practices to allow wind and solar developers to adjust 
their transmission scheduling on a more frequent basis; provide better 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/2
02 WERNTZMACRO 3/23/2011  6:20 PM 
2011] LET’S MAKE A DEAL 423 
 
implemented financial incentives for new, non-routine 
transmission infrastructure, responding, in part, to Congressional 
directive.8
The need for transmission has intensified now that many 
states have adopted renewable portfolio standards.
 
9
 
communications between utilities and renewable generators; and establish a 
generic ancillary service rate schedule for generator regulation service). 
  This is 
partially attributable to the fact that many of these abundant 
renewable resources, such as those located in the Southwest and 
Northwest, are “location constrained,” i.e., remotely located from 
customer centers, in regions where there is insufficient 
 8. Congress directed FERC to adopt rules providing the opportunity to 
collect incentive-based transmission rates, including a return on equity that 
attracts investment in transmission, such as the deployment of new 
transmission technologies. 16 U.S.C. § 824(s) (2006).  FERC accomplished this 
mandate in Promoting Transmission Investment Through Pricing Reform, 
Order No. 679, 71 Fed. Reg. 43,294, 43,294 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n July 31, 
2006), order on reh’g, Order No. 679-A, 72 Fed. Reg. 1152 (Fed. Energy Reg. 
Comm’n Jan. 10, 2007), order on reh’g, 119 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,062 (2007) (adopting 
regulations to bolster investment in transmission infrastructure, promote 
reliability, and reduce costs to consumers).  The Commission has granted 
incentives in over fifty cases.  The details of these cases can be found at FERC, 
eLibrary, http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2011); 
see also Posting of Esther Whieldon to Power Lines, 
http://www.platts.com/weblog/powerlines/2010/11/ 
01/ferc_does_its_part_for_administrations.html (Nov. 1, 2010, 15:17 EST) 
(reporting that FERC awarded some incentives to a project that supported the 
public policy goal of getting more renewable on line despite the fact that it had 
not been proven to reduce congestion or ensure grid reliability). 
 9. A Renewable Portfolio Standard (“RPS”) requires a percentage of an 
electricity provider’s energy sales (“MW/h”) or installed capacity (“MW”) to be 
derived from renewable resources. See Joshua P. Fershee, Moving Power 
Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking Energy Policy Based on a National RPS, 
42 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 1415 (2010) (asserting that successful RPS will require 
significant infrastructure investment, including transmission); see also Cal. 
Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,224, at P 2 (2010) (revising 
transmission planning process to create a new category of “policy-driven” 
transmission, which would include transmission required to assist utilities in 
meeting California’s RPS goals).  As of August 2010, 29 states and the District of 
Columbia have an RPS, 7 states and 3 power authorities (Nebraska’s two larges 
public power districts and the Tennessee Valley Authority, which spans a 7-
state region), have renewable goals. FERC, Market Oversight, Renewable Power 
& Energy Efficiency Market: Renewable Portfolio Standards, 
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/othr-mkts/renew/othr-rnw-rps.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2011) (map percentages are final year’s targets). 
3
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transmission capacity to bring the resource to major markets.10
Merchant transmission providers are distinguished from 
other transmission providers by the fact that they do not serve 
captive retail customers and assume all market risk of a 
transmission project.
  
Whereas transmission development was once exclusively the 
province of incumbent utilities, independent transmission 
developers and merchant transmission developers are 
increasingly getting into the act, eager to build transmission 
facilities to bring renewable energy to purchasers. 
11  For the past decade, the Commission has 
recognized the important role merchant transmission projects can 
play in expanding competitive generation alternatives.12
 
 10. See Andrew Revkin, California Utility Looks to Mojave Desert Project for 
Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at B3 (“The reality is that renewable 
projects are very far away from where customers are[.]”); see also Ill. Com. 
Comm’n, 576 F.3d at 478 (stating that electricity restructuring and “demand for 
power from renewable generation sources (such as wind farms) that are often 
located in places remote from centers of electric consumption” have placed 
additional strains on the already strained transmission grid.); SunZia 
Transmission, L.L.C. (SunZia), 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,162, at P 21 (2010) (“The 
Commission is committed to supporting the development of new transmission 
infrastructure that is essential not only to providing location-constrained 
resources with access to markets, but also to meeting our nation's current and 
future energy needs.”) (citing Tres Amigas, L.L.C. (Tres Amigas I), 130 F.E.R.C. 
¶ 61,207 (2010); Cal. Indep. Trans. Sys. Operator Corp., 119 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,061 
(2007) (discussing unique challenges associated with location-constrained 
resources)). 
  The 
 11. Unlike traditional public utilities, merchant transmission providers 
assume all of a project’s market risk and have no captive pool from which to 
recoup project costs. See Chinook Power Transmission, L.L.C. (Chinook), 126 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134, at P 1 n.1 (2009).  Merchant transmission projects are 
distinct from independent transmission projects that request Commission 
approval for incentive rates, and whose costs are allocated to one or more 
customers without each customer’s contractual consent. See, e.g., Nev. Hydro 
Co., 122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,272 (2008) (annualized cost included in California 
Independent System Operator’s rate base); Trans Bay Cable, L.L.C., 112 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,095 (2005) (same). 
 12. See Wyo. Colo. Intertie, L.L.C., 127 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,125, at P 38 (2009) 
(stating that merchant transmission projects “can play a useful role in 
expanding competitive generation alternatives for customers and meeting 
reliability needs”); see also TransÉnergie U.S. Ltd. (TransÉnergie I), 91 F.E.R.C. 
¶ 61,230, 61,838 (2000) (agreeing with applicant that merchant transmission 
“enhances competition and market integration by expanding capacity and 
trading opportunities between the New England and New York markets.”); 
accord Tres Amigas I, 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,207, at P 77 (2010), order on motion for 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/2
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Commission has granted merchant transmission developers the 
right to charge for transmission service at negotiated rates, 
unencumbered by the traditional cost of service ratemaking 
principles and filings usually applied to transmission service.13  
FERC’s orders harmonize the Commission’s statutory 
responsibility to ensure that rates, terms and conditions of 
service are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory14 
with the merchant transmission developer’s need to obtain 
financing for its projects.15  Unlike incumbent utilities, merchant 
transmission developers have no obligation to build transmission 
projects, and will only do so where they are financially viable.  
The challenge for the Commission, therefore, is to facilitate 
financing transmission construction where it is needed, while at 
the same satisfying the requirement under the Federal Power Act 
(“FPA”) that rates are just and reasonable16
 
clarification, 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,281 (2010), reh’g denied, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,233 
(2010). 
 and preserving core 
 13. See, e.g., Champlain Hudson Power Express, Inc. (Champlain), 132 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,006, at P 59 (2010) (waiving the cost-based data and Form No. 1 
filing requirements); Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 68-69 (same).  Lacking 
captive customers, merchant transmission providers do not earn the regulated, 
cost-based rate of return that captive customers would traditionally pay.  
Instead, merchant transmission providers’ compensation comes from contracts 
they sign with customers to transmit electricity over their merchant 
transmission lines. See MATTHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. SEDANO, ELECTRICITY 
TRANSMISSION: A PRIMER 73 (2004), available at 
http://envhist.wisc.edu/cool_stuff/energy/grid.shtml.  An advantage of this 
approach is that it enables multi-state projects to progress outside the 
complicated process of inter-regional cost allocation; see Tres Amigas (Tres 
Amigas III), 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,233, at P 29 (2010). 
 14. Section 205 of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) requires that “[a]ll rates 
and charges made . . . shall be just and reasonable.” 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006).  
“FERC’s actions must be solidly grounded in its authorizing statutes.”  Hon. Jon 
Wellinghoff & David Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of Demand Response: 
The Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 28 ENERGY L.J. 389, 
397 (2002). 
 15. Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 45. 
 16. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006).  Courts have upheld FERC’s interpretation of 
the FPA as not requiring the use of any particular ratemaking methodology so 
long as the rates fall within a zone of reasonableness (i.e. neither excessive to 
the consumer nor less than compensatory to the seller). See, e.g., Fed. Power 
Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944); Bluefield Water 
Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923).  
In 1991, the Supreme Court affirmed that “the just and reasonable standard 
does not compel the Commission to use any single pricing formula. . . .” Mobil 
5
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principles like open access to transmission service and17 
transparency in capacity allocation.18
This article examines the Commission’s justification for 
granting merchant transmission providers negotiated rates in the 
context of antecedents in market-based rates for electricity 
generation and natural gas regulation.  Evolution of the 
Commission’s analysis for authorizing negotiated rates for 
merchant transmission analysis is considered, along with an 
assessment of the issues the Commission is likely to continue 
grappling with in the future.  Specifically, this article begins with 
an overview of the Commission’s market-based rate program 
because it was a precursor to negotiated rates for merchant 
transmission and provides a framework for evaluating similar 
market power
 
19
 
Oil Exploration & Producing Se. Inc. v. United Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 224 
(1991) (discussing the “just and reasonable” standard in the natural gas 
context).  It is a well-settled principle that comparable provisions, Natural Gas 
Act sections 4 and 5 and Federal Power Act sections 205 and 206, are generally 
read in pari materiae. Ky. Utils. Co. v. FERC, 760 F.2d 1321, 1321 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
 concerns.  It then turns to a consideration of 
natural gas regulation, to examine critical concepts merchant 
transmission developers borrowed from this discipline, notably 
negotiated rates, open seasons, and the use of anchor shippers or 
 17. “Open access” refers to non-discriminatory access to the transmission 
grid.  In 1993, the Commission began to require individual utilities, on a case-
by-case basis, to transmit competing wholesale sellers’ electricity over the 
utility’s transmission lines.  In 1996, to foster greater competition in wholesale 
power markets, the Commission promulgated industry-wide rules mandating all 
public utilities offer open access transmission service. See Preventing Undue 
Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890-D, 129 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,126, at P 1 (2009) (citing Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888 (Order No. 888), 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,540 (May 10, 1996), 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,046 (1998)); see also New York v. FERC, 
535 U.S. 1, 1 (2002); Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 
667, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 18. See, e.g., Mont. Alta. Tie, Ltd. (MATL), 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071, at P 37 
(2006) (“[T]he Commission’s concern in evaluating the open season process is to 
provide transparency in the bidding process and to enable unsuccessful bidders 
to determine if they were treated in a fair manner.”). 
 19. The Commission has defined market power as a seller’s ability to 
“significantly influence price in the market by withholding service and excluding 
competitors for a significant period of time.” Citizens Power & Light Corp., 48 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,210, 61,777 (1989). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/2
02 WERNTZMACRO 3/23/2011  6:20 PM 
2011] LET’S MAKE A DEAL 427 
 
anchor customers to secure financing for a project.  A comparison 
is made between market-based rates for natural gas storage and 
negotiated rates for transmission with respect to market power 
concerns.  Next, this article examines how the Commission’s 
evaluation of merchant transmission applications developed over 
time into the current, flexible four-factor approach.  The article 
concludes with a summary of the key requirements the 
Commission currently emphasizes when granting negotiated 
rates for merchant transmission and highlights a few potential 
issues for future consideration.20
II. MARKET-BASED AND NEGOTIATED RATE 
POLICIES 
 
A. Market-Based Rates for Electricity 
For most of the history of regulation under the FPA, rates for 
service were established under traditional cost of service 
ratemaking principles, pursuant to which a utility’s cost of 
providing service is ascertained and rates are assessed on that 
basis.21  Moreover, nearly all service provided by public utilities 
was offered on a “bundled basis” – combined generation, 
transmission, and distribution service – to retail customers 
taking retail service regulated by state public service 
commissions.  FERC and its predecessor, the Federal Power 
Commission, have authority under the FPA to regulate interstate 
transmission and wholesale sales of electricity, but little such 
service was historically provided on an unbundled basis.22
 
 20. On the brink of this article’s publication, the Commission signaled its 
interest in further exploring merchant transmission issues in a technical 
conference forum. See Notice of Technical Conference re Priority Rights to New 
Participant Funded Transmission, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,238, 11,238 (Mar. 1, 2011) 
(exploring issues related to new transmission infrastructure ownership models, 
including merchant transmission). 
 
 21. For a complete discussion of traditional cost of service ratemaking, see 
generally JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 
(1961). 
 22. See generally New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
7
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With the passage of Section 210 of the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”),23 Congress 
encouraged the development of independently owned power 
generation through a program entitling independent power 
producers (“IPPs”) to sell their power to utilities at a utility’s own 
incremental cost of providing electricity (“avoided cost”).24  With 
that, and with FERC’s authority to compel the provision of 
unbundled transmission service under section 211 of the FPA,25 
attention turned to the conditions under which independent 
generators could gain access to the unbundled transmission 
service essential to serving a newly competitive wholesale 
market.  Further, the increasing availability of competitive 
generation raised the question whether such generation was 
sufficiently competitive to protect customers and ensure just and 
reasonable rates through competition instead of via traditional 
cost of service regulation.26
While Section 211 of the FPA authorized FERC to compel the 
provision of transmission service on a case-by-case basis, the 
Commission concluded in issuing Order No. 888 that a ubiquitous 
“open access” requirement was necessary to protect customers, 
including IPPs, from discrimination in the provision of 
transmission service deemed essential to achieving sufficiently 
robust generation competition.
 
27  The Commission concluded that 
without regulatory reform, utilities possessed an economic 
incentive to block competitors’ access to their transmission 
networks, protecting their monopoly status within a geographic 
region or service territory.28
With the provision of open access transmission service in 
place, in conjunction with technological advances that improved 
the competitiveness of wholesale power markets, the Commission 
 
 
 23. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3. 
 24. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d). 
 25. See 18 U.S.C. § 824j. 
 26. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 26. 
 27. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded 
Costs by Public Utilities and transmitting Utilities, FERC Order No. 888-A, 62 
Fed. Reg. 12,274, 12,275 (Mar. 14, 1997) (“[A]bsent open access, undue 
discrimination will continue . . . .”). 
 28. Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/2
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began considering applications for market-based rates for 
wholesale power sales.29  In contrast to a cost-based rate, a 
market-based rate does not specify the precise rate, but rather 
allows the rate to be negotiated or arbitrated between the seller 
and its customers.  Granting market-based rate authority in lieu 
of setting cost-based rates for wholesale power sales constituted a 
fundamental shift in Commission policy.  Whereas cost-based 
ratemaking “focused on preventing the exercise of market power 
by controlling profits rather than fostering efficiency[,]”30 market-
based rates were intended to “create competitive pressures that 
would improve efficiency, reduce costs, and lower wholesale 
power prices.”31
Turning to the law, the Commission found in the statutory 
mandate to set “just and reasonable” rates under section 205 of 
the FPA,
 
32 the provision under which it has historically approved 
cost-based rates, sufficient authority to allow market forces to 
protect the public interest.33  The Commission found, and courts 
agreed, that in a competitive market, market-based rates are just 
and reasonable, provided “the seller and its affiliates do not have, 
or adequately have mitigated, market power.”34
 
 29. See Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity 
and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 697 (Order No. 697), 121 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,260, at P 7 (2007). 
  The principle 
underlying this approach is that “in a competitive market, where 
neither buyer nor seller has significant market power, it is 
 30. Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and the 
Authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 26 ENERGY L.J. 1, 9 (2005) 
(citing ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 26-30 (1970)). 
 31. Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of 
Federal Energy Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 643 (2009); see also Entergy Servs. 
Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,234, 61,753 (1992) (approving market-based rates because 
rates set through competitive forces will result in cost savings to ratepayers); 
Public Serv. Co. of In., 51 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,367, 61,224-25 (1990) (finding that 
competitive pricing improves efficiency by creating incentives for full use of 
existing capacity). 
 32. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). 
 33. Kelliher & Farinella, supra note 31, at 643-44. 
 34. La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting challenge to FERC’s approval of an electrical utility’s application to 
charge market-based rates because FERC had determined the utility lacks 
market power). 
9
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rational to assume that the terms of their voluntary exchange are 
reasonable, and specifically to infer that the price is close to 
marginal cost, such that the seller makes only a normal return on 
its investment.”35  While the Supreme Court has yet to opine on 
the lawfulness of the market-based rate program, “[b]oth the 
Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have generally approved 
FERC’s scheme of market-based rates.”36
From the inception of the market-based rate program, the 
Commission has evaluated wholesale supplier applications for 
market-based rates on a case-by-case, applicant-centric basis.
 
37  
The Commission does not evaluate the competitiveness of the 
market as a whole, but rather whether the market is competitive 
vis-à-vis the applicant for market-based rate authority, and 
courts have endorsed this approach.38
 
 35. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tejas 
Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 
 36. Morgan Stanley v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., Wash., 554 
U.S. 527, 538 (citing Lockyer, 383 F.3d at 1011-13; La. Energy & Power Auth., 
141 F.3d at 365).  The D.C. Circuit first upheld market-based rates in the 
natural gas context, holding that “when there is a competitive market the FERC 
may rely upon market-based prices in lieu of cost-of-service regulation to assure 
a ‘just and reasonable’ result.” Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. FERC, 10 F.3d 866, 870 
(D.C. Cir. 1993).  The court in Louisiana Energy & Power Authority first upheld 
market-based rates for an electric utility.  The case involved a plaintiff’s 
challenge to FERC’s approval of an electric utility’s application to charge. La. 
Energy & Power Auth., 141 F.3d at 365. 
 37. See Order No. 697, 121 FERC ¶ 61,260, at P 7 (2007). 
 38.  
We have never held that FERC must establish the competitiveness 
of an entire market before permitting any participant to charge 
market-based rates. We have required that, before FERC approves 
an individual seller's use of market-based pricing in lieu of cost-of-
service regulation, it must determine that "the seller and its 
affiliates do not have, or adequately have mitigated, market power in 
the generation and transmission of [electric] energy, and cannot 
erect other barriers to entry by potential competitors. . . . In other 
words, what matters is whether an individual seller is able to exercise 
anticompetitive market power, not whether the market as a whole is 
structurally competitive. 
Blumenthal v. FERC, 552 F.3d 875, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing La. Energy & 
Power Auth., 141 F.3d at 365) (emphasis added); see also Consumers Energy Co. 
v. FERC, 367 F.3d 915, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Elizabethtown Gas Co., 10 F.3d 
at 871; see also Tejas Power Corp., 908 F.2d at 1004. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/2
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Over time, the Commission steadily refined its market power 
tests to better protect customers from the exercise of market 
power and to provide greater certainty to sellers seeking market-
based rate authority.  The Commission’s efforts culminated in a 
final rule issued on June 21, 2007, which reformed its market-
based rate program and codified its market-based rate standards 
in its regulations.39  There are three critical features of the 
Commission’s current market-based rate regime: upfront 
applicant evaluation; additional safeguards against market power 
exercise in organized markets; and multiple layers of ongoing 
evaluation to protect consumers.40
The first of these features, “rigorous” upfront analysis, calls 
for an assessment of whether the applicant-seller has or any of its 
affiliates have market power in generation or transmission and, if 
so, whether such market power has been mitigated.
 
41  The 
Commission uses a two-part test.  Part one assesses horizontal 
(generation) market power using two indicative screens: (1) 
pivotal supplier analysis, based on annual peak demand and (2) 
seasonal market share analysis.42  Failure of either screen 
creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant seller has 
market power.43  The second part of the test evaluates vertical 
(transmission and other barriers to market entry) market power.  
To prevent the exercise of vertical market power, the Commission 
requires that where a public utility or its affiliate owns, operates 
or controls transmission facilities, it must have an Open Access 
Transmission Tariff on file with the Commission before obtaining 
authorization to charge market-based rates.44  In addition, if a 
transmission owner loses market-based rate authority, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that all of its affiliates in the same 
market will also lose market-based rate authority.45
If the seller is authorized to charge market-based rates, the 
authorization is conditioned on: (1) affiliate restrictions on 
 
 
 39. Order No. 697, 121 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,260, at P 6 (2007). 
 40. Id. at P 2. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at P 13-20. 
 43. Id. at P 13. 
 44. Id. at P 21. 
 45. Order No. 697, 121 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,260 at P 2. 
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transactions and conduct between power sales affiliates where 
one or more affiliates have captive customers and (2) ongoing 
filing requirements.46  Order No. 697 codifies the prohibition on 
power sales between a franchised public utility with captive 
customers and its affiliates without first receiving Commission 
authorization.47  It also codifies the restriction contained in the 
market-based rate code of conduct regarding separation of 
functions, information sharing, sales of non-power goods, and 
power marketing.48  As for ongoing filing requirements, these 
include the submission of post-transaction electric quarterly 
reports containing specific information about contracts and 
transactions; the notification of any change of status; and the 
updates large sellers must file triennially.49
The second feature of the market-based rate regime requires 
wholesale sellers that have market-based rate authority and sell 
into the markets administered by a Regional Transmission 
Organization (“RTO”) or Independent System Operator (“ISO”) to 
abide by the market rules the Commission has approved for all 
market participants.
 
50
 
 46. Id.; see also Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, 
Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 697-A, 123 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,055, at P 410 (2008) (explaining that “the Commission has in place 
“multiple layers” of protections for customer to ensure that market based rates 
are just and reasonable and that they remain so.”). 
  These market rules provide additional 
checks on market power to ensure rates are just and reasonable.  
They include market power mitigation measures, price caps 
where appropriate, and market monitors to help oversee market 
behaviors and competitive conditions. 
 47. Order No. 697, 121 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,260 at P 23. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at P 3.  “Mitigation” of market power is required for sellers who fail 
one or both of the indicative horizontal market power screens and, if they 
attempted to rebut the presumption of market power with a delivered price test, 
failed that test.  The Commission’s default is cost-based mitigation, although 
sellers can propose alternative non-cost based mitigation, which the Commission 
may approve on a case-by-case basis. Id. at P 25 n.12.  This may include the 
spin-off of generation that enables the seller to exercise market power.  
Mitigation applies in all balancing area authorities where the seller is presumed 
or found to have market power; mitigated sellers can obtain and retain market-
based rate authority in areas where the Commission has found they do not have 
market power. Id. at P 28. 
 50. Id. at P 4. 
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Third, after the initial authorization has been granted, the 
Commission exercises ongoing oversight of market conditions and 
market-based rate authorizations.  The Commission addresses 
any market power concerns that subsequently develop and 
modifies rates as necessary.  This oversight is accomplished in 
part through its “significantly enhanced” market oversight and 
enforcement division, as well as the opportunity to act on 
complaints (initiated sua sponte or by a market participant) 
under section 206 of the FPA.51  For example, if an electric 
quarterly report or a triennial update filing indicates that a seller 
may have acquired market power subsequent to receipt of its 
original market-based rate authorization, the Commission may 
initiate a section 206 proceeding to revoke a seller’s market-based 
authorization.  Based on review of electronic quarterly reports or 
daily price information, the Commission may also investigate a 
specific public utility or market anomaly to ascertain whether 
there has been any violation of RTO/ISO market rules or 
Commission orders or tariffs, or any prohibited market 
manipulation, and take remedial action.  Remedies include 
refunds to customers, disgorgement of profits for tariff violations, 
and civil penalties if the seller engaged in prohibited market 
manipulation or violated Commission orders, tariffs, or rules.  In 
addition, the Commission could refer the matter to the 
Department of Justice for potential criminal prosecution.52
In the twenty years since the Commission first began to 
grant market-based rate authority, the Commission has evinced a 
willingness to refine its market-based rate program continuously 
and to guard vigilantly against the exercise of market power.  The 
current market-based rate program entails “multiple layers”
 
53 of 
filing and reporting requirements and incorporates numerous54
 
 51. 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (2006). 
 
protections against excessive rates.  The ongoing reporting 
requirement was a critical factor in persuading the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to uphold generally the 
 52. 16 U.S.C. § 825m (2006). 
 53. Order No. 697, 121 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,260 at P 967. 
 54. Id. at P 970. 
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Commission’s market-based rate program.55
B. Natural Gas Act Precedent: 
  Further, preventing 
affiliate abuse is a critical component of the Commission’s 
market-based rate program.  Finally, the market-based rate 
applicant has the burden to justify that it lacks market power or 
has adequately mitigated power, and this is a continuing 
obligation.  While its authorization of negotiated rates for 
merchant transmission only reaches back a decade, to a certain 
degree, the Commission implicitly incorporates these aspects of 
its market-based rate program into its merchant transmission 
assessment in order to protect customers. 
1. Negotiated/Recourse Rates 
The Commission’s traditional approach to natural gas 
ratemaking has been to set an annual revenue requirement for 
regulated interstate pipelines based on operating and capital 
costs incurred during a historic test period, adjusted for known 
and measurable changes expected to occur by the time rates take 
effect.56  In general, rates are designed to recover the annual 
revenue requirement based on contract capacity entitlements and 
projected annual or seasonal volumes.57  In 1989, Congress urged 
the Commission to “improve the competitive structure [of the 
natural gas industry] in order to maximize the benefits of 
wellhead decontrol.”58
 
 55. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding of the 
absence of market power, coupled with ongoing reporting requirements, satisfies 
the notice and filing requirements of section 205 of the Federal Power Act). 
  The Commission responded by taking 
steps to ensure that all natural gas customers (i.e. shippers) have 
meaningful access to the transportation system and to maximize 
competition through an open access program that served as the 
intellectual antecedent to Order No. 888 in the electric 
 56. Alternatives to Traditional Cost-of-Service Ratemaking for Natural Gas 
Pipelines, 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,139, 61,393 (1995). 
 57. Id. 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 29, at 6 (1980) (cited in Alternatives to Traditional Cost-of-
Service Ratemaking of Natural Gas Pipelines, 74 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,076, 61,225 n.2 
(1996).  Wellhead decontrol refers to the cessation of regulation of natural gas 
prices. 
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industry.59  The next step was to provide additional rate design 
flexibility in the post-restructuring environment.60  In its 1996 
Alternative Rate Policy Statement, the Commission declared that 
it was willing to accept, on a shipper-by-shipper basis, filings 
requesting authority to charge negotiated rates for pipeline 
transportation service.61  But the Commission made clear that it 
would only accept such negotiated rates subject to the proviso 
that customers retain the ability to choose a cost-of-service based 
tariff rate as backstop regulatory protection from the exercise of 
market power.62
 
 59. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing 
Self-Implementing Transportation Under Part 284 of the Commission’s 
Regulations, and Regulation of Natural Gas After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 
Order No. 636, 57 Fed. Reg. 13267, 13295 (1992), FERC Stats. & Regs ¶ 30,939, 
order on reh’g, Order No. 636-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,950, order on reh’g, 
Order No. 636-B, 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,272 (1992), reh’g denied, Order No. 636-C, 62 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,007 (1993), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom; United 
Distrib. Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996), order on remand, Order 
No. 636-C, 78 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,186 (1997). 
  The Commission concluded that 
negotiated/recourse service – rates negotiated between the 
pipeline and the customer, with a recourse cost-of service rate 
available at the customer’s request – could achieve flexible, 
efficient pricing when market-based rates would not be 
appropriate due to concerns the pipeline could potentially 
 60. See Alternatives to Traditional Cost-of-Service Ratemaking of Natural 
Gas Pipelines, 74 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,076, 61,225 (1996), reh'g and clarification 
denied, 75 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,024 (1996), petitions denied and dismissed, Burlington 
Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, 172 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter 1996 
Alternative Rate Policy Statement]; see also Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 72 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,083, 61,440 (1995) (willing to permit pipelines flexibility to 
negotiate rates with current and prospective customers for unsubscribed 
capacity).  The initial rate placed into effect via a certificate proceeding under 
section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2006), establishes the 
maximum recourse rate ceiling level, unless the natural gas pipeline makes a 
filing to change the recourse rate under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 717c(2006). See Portland Natural Gas Trans. Sys., 134 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,129, at P 3-7 (2011). 
 61. 1996 Alternative Rate Policy Statement, supra note 60, at 61,241.  With 
respect to market-based rates, the Commission pointed out that it had already 
determined that “where a natural gas company can establish that it lacks 
significant market power, market based rates are a viable option for achieving 
the flexibility and added efficiency required by the current market-place.” Id. at 
61,227 (citations omitted). 
 62. Id. 
15
02 WERNTZMACRO 3/23/2011  6:20 PM 
436 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  28 
 
exercise market power.63  The availability of a recourse service 
would prevent pipelines from exercising market power because 
the customer could always fall back on the traditional cost-of-
service rate if the pipeline were to withhold service or demand 
excessive rates.64  In this manner, the recourse rate mitigates 
market power, and thus obviates the need to demonstrate 
absence of market power.65  “At a minimum, negotiated/recourse 
rates offer the potential for increased market responsiveness in 
pipeline services without protracted disputes regarding market 
power.”66  While the Commission has updated its natural gas 
pricing policy a few times since it was first issued,67
2. Natural Gas Storage Service 
 this remains 
the basic framework. 
The Commission generally evaluates applicants’ requests for 
market-based rates for storage services under its 1996 
Alternative Rate Policy Statement.68  The Commission has 
approved market-based rates for storage providers where the 
applicant has demonstrated it lacks market power or has adopted 
conditions that significantly mitigate market power.69  For 
example, the Commission has approved applications for market-
based rates for storage where it found the applicants would be 
unable to exercise market power due to their small size, the 
presence of numerous competitors, or the small share of the 
market that the participant has.70
 
 63. Id. at 61,240. 
  In defining the relevant 
market for purposes of calculating market concentration and 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See, e.g., Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities 
(1999 Pricing Policy Statement), 88 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,227, 61,737 (1999) 
(establishing rebuttable presumption favoring incremental rates over rolled-in 
rates to protect historic customers from subsidizing new customers), clarified, 90 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,128, further clarified, 92 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,094 (2000). 
 68. See generally 1996 Alternative Rate Policy Statement, supra note 60. 
 69. Rate Regulation of Certain Natural Gas Storage Facilities, Order No. 678 
(Order No. 678), 71 Fed. Reg. 36,612, 36,612 (June 27, 2006) (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 284). 
 70. See, e.g., Egan Hub Partners, 99 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,269, at P 17 (2002). 
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market share, pursuant to Order No. 678, the Commission now 
allows consideration of close substitutes for gas storage, such as 
available pipeline capacity, liquefied natural gas, local gas 
production, and released transportation capacity.71  To be a good 
substitute, the alternative must be comparable in terms of 
availability, quality, and price.72
Section 312 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
 
73 (“EPAct 2005”) 
added a new section 4(f) to the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”).74  This 
provision explicitly gives the Commission authority to permit 
natural gas companies to provide storage and storage-related 
services at market-based rates for new storage capacity (placed 
into service after the date of enactment of the Act), even where 
the company cannot demonstrate it lacks market power.  To 
authorize negotiation of market-based rates for natural gas 
storage where the applicant cannot demonstrate lack of market 
power, the Commission must determine that market-based rates 
are in the public interest and needed to encourage the 
construction of the capacity.75  It also must ensure that 
reasonable terms and conditions are in place to protect consumers 
and periodically review the market-based rates authorized to 
ensure they remain just, reasonable, and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.76
In addition to modifying the Commission’s market power 
analysis to allow consideration of close substitutes for natural 
gas, as discussed above, Order No. 678 also adopted regulation 
implementing section 4(f) of the NGA.
 
77
 
 71. Order No. 678, 71 Fed. Reg. at 36,612; see also Steckman Ridge, L.P., 123 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,248, at P 33 (2008) (approving market-based rates for storage 
where proposed storage facilities will be in a highly competitive area with 
numerous storage alternatives; proposed market shares are low, market area 
HHI of the applicant and its affiliates are mitigated by applicant’s small market 
share, the availability of competing services, affiliate storage fields are subject 
to cost-based rates and applicants entry into the market will increase storage 
options in the region). 
  Order No. 678 permits 
 72. Order No. 678, 71 Fed. Reg. at 36,617-18. 
 73. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 312, 199 Stat. 594, 688 
(2005) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717 (c)(f)(1)(A)). 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (2006). 
 75. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 312. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Order No. 678, 71 Fed. Reg. at 36,612. 
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storage providers that are unable to demonstrate lack of market 
power to negotiate market-based rates if they meet the following 
criteria: (1) the capacity that enables provision of the service was 
placed in service after the enactment date of EPAct; and (2) 
market-based rates must be in the public interest and necessary 
to facilitate construction of storage capacity where the facility is 
needed; customers must be protected.78  Further, the applicant 
can demonstrate storage is needed in the area by providing 
evidence of a lack of storage in the region; full utilization of 
existing storage capacity; nearby pipeline constraints; and 
projected increased demand for natural gas in the region.79
The Commission has declared that its pricing policies are to 
ensure access to storage services on a nondiscriminatory basis at 
just and reasonable rates and to provide that sufficient storage 
capacity will be available to meet anticipated increases in market 
demand.
 
80  The Commission further explained that Order No. 
678’s overarching purpose is to reduce the volatility of natural 
gas prices and improve adequacy of natural gas supply during 
peak demand periods by encouraging expansions of gas storage 
capacity while protecting customers from the exercise of market 
power.  In essence, Order No. 678 reconciles, on the one hand, the 
need to facilitate development of new natural gas storage 
capacity, with, on the other hand, the statutory duty to protect 
customers from unjust and unreasonable rates.81
3. Precedent/Anchor Shipper Agreements 
 
Prior to constructing any facilities for providing service or 
initiating any new service, the pipeline must receive permission 
from the Commission in the form of a certificate of convenience 
 
 78. Id. at 36,624. 
 79. See, e.g., Tex. Gas Trans., L.L.C., 122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,190, 62,105 at P 25 
(2008) (approving market-based rates where applicant demonstrated that but 
for the market-based rates the project would not be built; customers would be 
protected because the open season offered an incremental cost-based reserve 
price for the proposed storage capacity and all available market-based storage 
capacity will be posted on a website and available via proposed auctions). 
 80. Id. at P 32. 
 81. Id. 
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and necessity.82  The Commission may impose conditions on the 
provision of service or construction of facilities.83  Under the 
Commission’s policy, the threshold requirement for proposing 
new projects is that the pipeline must be prepared to support the 
project without relying on subsidization from existing 
customers.84
“[A]ll new interstate pipeline construction must be preceded by a 
non-discriminatory, non-preferential, open-season process 
through which potential shippers may seek and obtain firm 
capacity rights.  Second, as part of the open season, the project 
sponsor must offer a maximum recourse rate so that the bidder 
in the open season may have the option to choose between the 
recourse rate and a negotiated rate.”
  Furthermore, the Commission’s policy requires 
that: 
85
In order to demonstrate interest and obtain a certificate (and 
financing), pipelines traditionally enter into precedent 
agreements, also called anchor shipper agreements.
 
86
4. Prelude 
 
In sum, as will become evident in the next section of this 
discussion, natural gas precedent provided an important template 
for merchant transmission proposals.  Merchant transmission 
 
 82. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(f)(c) (2006). 
 83. JAMES H. MCGREW, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION § 31.15 
(2003). 
 84. Rockies Express Pipeline L.L.C., 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,272, at P 36 (2006); 
see generally Certification of New Interstate Nat. Gas Pipeline Facilities (1999 
Policy Statement), 88 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,277 (1999), order clarifying statement of 
policy, 90 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,128 (2000), order further clarifying statement of policy, 
92 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,094 (2000). 
 85. Rockies Express Pipeline L.L.C., 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,272 at P 71. 
 86. See, e.g., id. at P 24 (finding applicant’s proposal to be in the public 
interest, where negotiated rate and contractual terms are dependent on whether 
the shipper qualifies as a Standard Shipper, Anchor Shipper or Foundation 
Shipper, and all potential shippers had notice of the different negotiated 
reservation rate options and had equal opportunity to bid for capacity of the 
project); Gulf Crossing Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 123 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,100, at P 37 
(2008) (conditioning certificate authorization so construction cannot begin until 
pipeline executed contracts reflecting the levels and terms of service represented 
in its precedent agreements). 
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developers borrowed the concept of negotiated rates.  Although 
there is no explicit, Commission-approved maximum recourse 
rate in the merchant transmission context, there are implicit cost 
caps.  As in the NGA certificate process, the Commission also 
requires the use of transparent open seasons and post-open 
season reporting to ensure there is no undue discrimination, and 
customers have equal opportunity to obtain access to the 
merchant transmission service.  Within the past few years, as 
financing transmission projects grew more difficult, merchant 
transmission developers also borrowed the anchor shipper 
concept to line up anchor customer in advance to demonstrate 
and generate interest in the project and secure upfront financing.  
Finally, the negative implication that flows from section 4(f) of 
the NGA is that the Commission cannot assume a lack of market 
power for merchant transmission providers; rather, the 
Commission can only grant negotiated rate authority where there 
is an absence of market power, even if it would be in the public 
interest to build a line.87
III. NEGOTIATED RATES FOR MERCHANT 
TRANSMISSION AND PRIORITY ACCESS 
 
A. Early Precedent: Open Season, Open Access and Ten 
Criteria 
The early merchant transmission proposals were prompted in 
part by the development of organized markets – RTOs and ISOs.  
Particularly as these organized energy markets expanded in 
geographic scope, they created a concomitant need for additional 
transmission to support generation competition, and also 
provided opportunities for merchant transmission providers to 
 
 87. Cf. Estate of Bell v. Comm’r, 928 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Congress 
is presumed to act intentionally and purposely when it includes language in one 
section but omits it in another.”); Ariz. Elec. Power Co-op. v. United States, 816 
F.2d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (“When Congress includes a specific term in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it should not 
be implied where it is excluded.”). 
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offer competitive generation alternatives.88  Consequently, one 
feature these early cases had in common is that they involved 
applications for merchant transmission facilities located either 
within or adjacent to an organized market.89  In these seminal 
cases, the Commission accepted the merchant transmission 
developers’ basic economic rationale for justifying negotiated 
rates – i.e., that the negotiated rates will reflect the price 
differentials between location marginal prices in the organized 
markets at each end of the line, and will essentially be capped at 
the cost of expanding the systems at each end of the line.90  The 
merchant transmission facilities essentially function as a 
generation substitute, providing a means to transmit lower cost 
generation from where the line begins (source) to a region of 
higher cost generation where the line ends (sinks).91
 
 88. See TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,230, 61,838 (2000) (finding 
merchant transmission project connecting two organized markets “can play a 
useful role in expanding competitive generation alternatives for customers.”); 
Neptune Reg’l Transmission Sys. (Neptune I), 96 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,147, 61,633 reh’g, 
96 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,326 (2001), on motion for clarification, 98 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,140 
(2002), granting in part and denying in part request for modification of prior 
order and granting clarification, 103 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,213 (2003) (“Like the 
TransÉnergie Project, the Commission believes that the Neptune Project can 
play a useful role in expanding competitive generation alternatives for 
customers.”); see also Richard P. Bonnefield & Ronald L. Drewnoski, 
Transmission at a Crossroads, 21 ENERGY L.J. 447, 460 n.43 (2000) (“Merchant 
transmission lines can be installed between a source and a load market . . . . 
earning revenues by bidding into destination generation markets with 
generation purchased from the source market, thus earning arbitrage between 
the markets.”). 
  In this 
 89. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,143, at P 35 (2009). 
 90. TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,836; Neptune I, 96 F.E.R.C. at 61,633; 
Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 38 n.26.  In Chinook, the Commission 
summarized: 
For example, negotiated rates may be appropriate when the service 
on a neighboring public utility under cost-of-service rates – 
essentially capped at the utility’s cost of expansion – can provide a 
reasonable alternative.  A further check on the negotiated rates 
could exist where the price customers are willing to pay for 
transmission service is disciplined by the difference in generation 
prices at the ends of the line (i.e., the market price of generation on 
either sides of the line). 
Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 38 n.26. 
 91. As economists have explained, “Merchant transmission projects that 
increase capacity between an import constrained area with high nodal prices 
and an export constrained area with low nodal prices are, in a sense, substitutes 
21
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manner, merchant transmission enhances competition and 
trading opportunities, and should help prices between the two 
regions to converge.  The rationale behind negotiated rates for 
merchant transmission essentially parallels the justification for 
negotiated rates in the natural gas context.  Natural gas pipelines 
are allowed to charge negotiated rates for transporting natural 
gas because the customer always has the option of requesting the 
pipeline to provide service under its cost-based recourse rate, 
which essentially caps the rate for transporting natural gas.92  
Where negotiated rate authority for merchant transmission is 
concerned, at least theoretically, the generator customer always 
has the option of requesting transmission service, and expansion 
if necessary to provide service, at cost-based rates from its 
incumbent utility provider.93  The only ostensible difference 
between these two regimes is that in the merchant transmission 
context, the cost-based provider and the merchant transmission 
provider would be different entities, as opposed to a single 
natural gas pipeline.94
During this nascent period of assessing negotiated rate 
applications, the Commission also experimented with various 
criteria for evaluating the justness and reasonableness of 
negotiated rates for merchant transmission facilities.  In 
particular, the Commission grappled with issues such as the use 
of open seasons to provide transparency and ensure there is no 
undue discrimination in the allocation of transmission rights on 
the merchant facilities; requiring transmission facilities to be 
turned over to a neighboring RTO/ISO and service provided 
 
 
for generation projects of equivalent capacity inside the import constrained 
area.” Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, Merchant Transmission Investment 56 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9534, 2003), available at 
http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/1159.  “While the merchant transmission project 
does not compete directly with this kind of generation project, it does make it 
possible for generators outside the constrained area to compete with existing 
and new generators inside the import constrained area.” Id. 
 92. 1996 Alternative Rate Policy Statement, supra note 60, at 61,241. 
 93. See, e.g., TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,838. 
 94. See, e.g., MATL, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071, at P 52 (2006) (“In summary, the 
Commission found in TransÉnergie that negotiated rate authority could be 
granted to a merchant transmission facility interconnected with an RTO given 
the cap effectively created by the difference in LMP prices on each end of the 
merchant line and the expansion cost cap.”). 
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under the open access transmission tariff of the RTO/ISO that 
operates the merchant transmission facility; and prevention of 
favoritism towards affiliates.  Key features of these critical cases 
are discussed below. 
1. TransÉnergie: Justification for Negotiated Rates 
and Evaluation Criteria 
In June 2000, the Commission granted the first merchant 
transmission owner application for negotiated rate authority in 
TransÉnergie.95  TransÉnergie proposed to construct a 26-mile, 
undersea bi-directional high-voltage direct current96 cable 
interconnection between Connecticut and Long Island, New York 
(“Cross-Sound Cable”).97  The Cross-Sound Cable would connect 
the control areas of the New York Independent System Operator 
(“NYISO”) and the New England Independent System Operator 
(“ISO-New England”).98  TransÉnergie requested “blanket 
authority” to make sales of firm transmission capacity on the 
cable at market-based rates.99  TransÉnergie emphasized that, 
“unlike traditional utilities recovering construction costs from 
their captive customers, investors in its project would assume the 
full market risk and were not in a position to exercise market 
power.”100
To justify its request, TransÉnergie asserted that its 
“negotiated rates that will essentially reflect location-differential 
costs for competitive generation sales between the New York and 
New England markets.”
 
101
 
 95. TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,835; see also Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. at P 
33 n.16 (stating that the first merchant transmission owner’s application for 
negotiated rates was granted in June 2000) (citing TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,230). 
  TransÉnergie proposed to conduct an 
 96. The term “direct current” refers to “[e]lectricity that flows continuously in 
one direction, as contrasted with alternating current.” EDISON ELEC. INST., 
GLOSSARY OF ELECTRIC INDUSTRY TERMS 43 (2005), available at 
http://www.eei.org/meetings/Meeting%20Documents/TWMS-26-glossry-
electerm.pdf. 
 97. TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,835. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 61,835. 
 100. Id. at 61,836. 
 101. Id. 
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open season for the initial subscription of firm transmission 
rights, followed by an auction for any unsubscribed rights.  
TransÉnergie provided a number of reasons why it would not be 
able to exercise market power, including the following: (1) the 
generation markets are competitive on each end of the line, while 
the new facilities would not constrain these competitive 
conditions and may serve to increase generation in those 
markets; (2) the initial allocation of firm transmission rights 
would be pursuant to a non-discriminatory open season; (3) it will 
not allow any of its affiliates to participate in the initial open 
season process; (4) after the open season, it will post and offer 
available firm transmission rights for sale on its Open-Access 
Same-Time Information System (“OASIS”); (5) physical access to 
the project will be provided in a non-discriminatory manner via 
scheduling and dispatch by NYISO and ISO-NE.102
The Commission conditionally approved TransÉnergie’s 
proposal to provide service over the Cross-Sound Cable at 
negotiated rates reflecting the location-differential prices between 
ISO-NE and NYISO.
 
103  According to the Commission, the project 
would benefit producers and consumers in both markets by 
enhancing competition and market integration and expanding 
capacity and trading opportunities, while imposing no cost or risk 
on captive customers.104
In granting negotiated rate authority for the proposed 
project, the Commission accepted the applicant’s explanation that 
“[s]ince TransEnergies [sic] proposal permits parties with firm 
transmission rights to arbitrage the generation prices between 
New Haven and Long Island, the negotiated rates will essentially 
 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,839.  Among the conditions on approval 
of the project, the Commission required TransÉnergie to make the following 
compliance: provide the specific method it proposed to use in its open season; file 
the results of the open season 30 days after its close and specify the procedures 
for customers to use to reassign firm transmission rights; and join a regional 
transmission organization adjacent to or containing the geographic area of its 
project. See id. at 61,289; see TransÉnergie U.S., Ltd. (TransÉnergie II), 91 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,347, 62,167 (2000) (accepting for filing TransÉnergie’s description 
of its open season process and accepting reports on open season, procedures for 
reassignment of transmission rights and proposed standards of conduct). 
 104. TransEnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,838. 
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be limited to the difference between the location-based marginal 
prices in the New York and New England markets.”105  In other 
words, customers would pay no more for transmission service 
over the merchant transmission line than the difference between 
the generation prices at each end of the transmission line, i.e., the 
difference between the locational marginal prices in the two ISOs 
that the merchant line interconnects.  The Commission further 
justified granting negotiated rates based on the fact that any 
customer in either of those markets could request that the ISO 
expand its transmission facilities to provide service at cost-based 
transmission rates.  This provided an expansion cost cap on 
TransÉnergie’s rates.106
Notably, while TransÉnergie had requested market-based 
rates because it considered its project to be more akin to a new 
merchant generation plant than to a traditional transmission 
investment, the Commission declined to address this issue.
 
107  
Instead, the Commission found it appropriate to approve 
TransÉnergie’s proposal to provide service under negotiated rates 
as being consistent with existing transmission pricing 
methodologies.108  As the Commission explained, it had “long 
permitted” transmission owners to charge the higher of embedded 
cost or opportunity pricing for transmission service.109
 
 105. Id. 
  For a 
 106. Id. at 61,839. 
 107. Id. at 61,838. 
 108. Id.  The demarcation between market-based rates and negotiated rates is 
not crystal clear, and the distinction may in part reflect the 1996 Alternative 
Pricing Policy Statement classification of market-based rates (applicant lacks 
market power and there is no recourse rate) and negotiated rates (no need to 
prove lack of market power as long as there is a recourse rate).  In general, the 
term “market-based rates” implies a competitive market where neither buyer 
nor seller has significant market power (or has adequately mitigated market 
power) whereas the term “negotiated rates” implies a bilateral negotiated 
transaction between two parties. See Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 
1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 109. TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,838 (citing Pa. Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,278, reh’g denied, 60 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,034, reh’g denied, 60 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,244 
(1994), aff’d Pa. Elec. Co. v. FERC, 11 F.3d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); see Jeffrey D. 
Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992 – A Watershed for 
Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447, 477 (1993).  
The Commission’s pricing policy is generally referred to as the higher of 
embedded cost or incremental cost, aptly described as follows: 
25
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vertically-integrated utility,110 where the utility sells both 
transmission and generation, opportunity costs are the costs 
incurred when the utility foregoes opportunities to reduce 
generation costs to serve its customers as a result of providing 
transmission service to a third party instead of using it to serve 
its own customers.111  According to the Commission, a 
“significant tenet” of its opportunity cost pricing policy is that 
prices should be capped at the transmission provider’s cost of 
expansion of its system.112  This means that where congestion 
costs 113 exceed the cost of expansion, expansion is the cheaper 
option, and the transmission provider should therefore expand its 
system.114
 
Under that model, the transmitting utility is entitled to recover 
operating costs, plus the capital costs of dedicated enlargements 
(e.g., radial lines or other facilities used exclusively for the wheeling 
service [citation omitted]), plus an allocable share of the capital costs 
of the transmission system equal to the greater of embedded cost or 
incremental cost; for purposes of this last cost component, 
incremental cost is defined as the lesser of the cost of expanding the 
system or the opportunity costs the transmitting utility incurs in 
order to provide the requested service.  Where the transmission 
system of the transmitting utility is not constrained – i.e., where 
there is sufficient unused capacity to provide the requested 
transmission – incremental costs will ordinarily be lower than 
embedded cost and the resulting rate will recover only the embedded 
capital cost of the transmission facility.  Where constraints exist, 
however, incremental costs (either expansion cost or opportunity 
cost) may exceed embedded cost. 
  Acknowledging that TransÉnergie, as a merchant 
transmission provider with no energy customers to serve, is in a 
different position because opportunity costs cannot be based on 
Watkiss & Smith, supra, at 477. 
  110. A vertically-integrated utility generally refers to an electric utility that 
owns generation, transmission, and distribution facilities.  “When a single 
company owns the entire system – from the generator to your meter – and sells 
you the power made in its generators, it is said to be vertically integrated.” 
PETER FOX-PENNER, supra note 4, at 10. 
 111. TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,838. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Congestion is defined as “[t]he condition that occurs when transmission 
capacity is not sufficient to enable safe delivery of all scheduled or desired 
wholesale electricity transfers simultaneously.” U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL 
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONGESTION STUDY 67 (2006), available at 
http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/ Congestion_Study_2006-
10.3.pdf. 
 114. TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,838-39. 
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the transmission provider’s generation costs, the Commission 
nevertheless found opportunity costs to be either the generation 
savings of the electricity customers served by TransÉnergie’s 
stand-alone transmission line or the savings provided by 
customers’ other alternatives, such as new generation.115  As 
noted above, the Commission further found that the expansion 
cost cap is provided by the obligation of the independent system 
operators that flank the project to expand at cost-based rates to 
meet new requests for transmission service – including facilities 
to provide service across Long Island Sound.116  Based on this 
line of reasoning, the Commission concluded that TransÉnergie ‘s 
pricing proposal constituted a form of opportunity pricing, which, 
“in this situation, is a logical extension of our prior [transmission 
pricing] policy.”117
While TransÉnergie originally proposed to construct a 600 
MW line, the final capacity of the line was about half the size, at 
330 MW.
 
118  Through the open season process, the entire 
transmission capacity was awarded in a 20-year contract to what 
is now Long Island Power Authority.119  The project was 
completed in July 2002 and emergency operations began on 
August 14, 2003, after the 2003 blackout.120
In its application, TransÉnergie proposed a set of seven “safe 
harbor” criteria for evaluating merchant transmission projects.
 
121
 
 115. Id. at 61,838.  This reflects the theories of economist Bill Hogan. See 
WILLIAM W. HOGAN, MARKET-BASED TRANSMISSION INVESTMENTS AND 
COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 1 (1999) (“A short-term electricity market 
coordinated by a system operator provides a foundation for a competitive 
electricity market. In this setting, locational price differences define the 
opportunity cost of transmission.”), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ 
fs/whogan/tran0899.pdf. 
  
 116. TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,838. 
 117. Id. (citing Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,153, 61,436 
(1999) (involving opportunity costs for short-term firm transmission rights)). 
 118. See TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,230; see Cross-Sound Cable Co., 
109 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,223, at P 2 (2004). 
 119. TransÉnergie U.S., Ltd. (TransÉnergie III), 93 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,289, 61,971 
(2000). 
 120. Cross-Sound Cable Co., 109 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,223 at P 25. 
 121. See TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,230, 61,837.  TransÉnergie proposed 
that the merchant transmission facility should: assume full market risk; create 
tradable transmission rights; use an open-season process initially to allocate 
transmission rights; not preclude access to essential facilities by competitors; be 
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The Commission used these criteria plus an additional criterion 
to assess TransÉnergie’s application, as well as subsequent 
applications,122
The ten criteria or “guideposts” used to assess whether it is 
just and reasonable to grant negotiated rate authority to a 
merchant transmission project are the following: (1) 
 and they became the foundation for the ten 
criteria the Commission used to assess merchant transmission 
provider applications for negotiated rate authority for nearly a 
decade. 
assumption 
of market risk: the merchant transmission facility must assume 
full market risk; (2) Open Access Transmission Tariff: operational 
control of the facility should be turned over to a neighboring 
ISO/RTO and the transmission service should be provided under 
that ISO’s or RTO’s Open Access Transmission Tariff; (3) 
secondary transmission rights: the merchant transmission facility 
should create tradable firm secondary transmission rights; (4) 
open season: an open season process should be used initially to 
allocate transmission rights; (5) open season report: the open 
season results should be posted on the OASIS and filed in a 
report to the Commission; (6) affiliate concerns: affiliate concerns 
should be adequately addressed (no undue discrimination); (7) 
access to essential facilities: the merchant transmission facility 
should not preclude competitors’ access to essential facilities; (8) 
market monitoring: the merchant transmission facilities should 
be subject to market monitoring for market power abuse; (9) 
reliability requirements: physical power flows on merchant 
transmission facilities should be coordinated with, and subject to, 
the relevant RTO or independent system operator’s reliability 
requirements; and (10) preexisting property rights: merchant 
transmission facilities should not impair pre-existing property 
rights to use the transmission grids of interconnected utilities or 
RTOs.123
 
subject to market monitoring for market power abuse; coordinate physical 
energy flows on merchant transmission facilities with and subject to reliability 
requirements of the relevant ISO or RTOs; and not impair pre-existing property 
rights to use the transmission system or inter-connected RTOS or utilities. Id. 
 
 122. See, e.g., Neptune I, 96 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,147, 61,633 (2001). 
 123. Sea Breeze Pacific San Juan de Fuca Cable (Sea Breeze), 112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,295, at P 16 (2005) (citing Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. (NUSCO I), 97 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,026 (2001)). 
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2. Neptune: Open Season 
Neptune proposed to build merchant transmission facilities 
that would connect, through undersea high-voltage, direct current 
lines, the capacity-rich regions of Maine, New Brunswick, and 
Nova Scotia with the capacity-deficient regions of Boston, New 
York City, Long Island, and Connecticut.124  The Commission 
evaluated Neptune’s application under the TransÉnergie criteria 
and conditionally approved Neptune’s request.  Pointing out that 
that Neptune was willing to assume all the risk of the project and 
proposed to establish rates that would be “effectively capped by 
market forces,”125 the Commission determined that the project 
could “play a useful role in expanding competitive generation 
alternatives for customers.”126  However, the Commission 
rejected both Neptune’s proposal to provide service under a 
stand-alone tariff and its request for a waiver of the requirement 
to provide service under an Open Access Transmission Tariff.  
Instead, as in TransÉnergie, the Commission conditioned 
approval of the application on Neptune joining an RTO or ISO 
adjacent to or containing the proposed project and placing those 
facilities under the transmission organization’s operational 
control.127
Significantly, Neptune brought the open season issue to the 
fore.  Neptune proposed to allocate at least eighty percent of the 
project’s capacity for long-term service, through transmission 
scheduling rights with duration of one year or longer.  All of the 
remaining capacity would be available on a short-term basis and 
sold in the open seasons administered by the RTO.
 
128
 
 124. Neptune I, 96 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,147, 61,629 (2001). 
  Neptune 
argued that these short-term open seasons would provide a check 
on potential exercise of market power by long-term capacity 
holders because the short-term prices would limit the price at 
which the long-term capacity could be resold on the secondary 
 125. Id. at 61,633. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  Note that Neptune’s application was submitted during a time when 
there was the possibility that there would be one Northeastern RTO. See id. 
 128. Id. at 61,631. 
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market.129  They would also ensure that some generation would 
have the opportunity to use Neptune’s system in competition with 
long-term capacity holders.  In addition, Neptune originally 
proposed to negotiate bilateral agreements with large customers 
for up to thirty percent of the capacity of the project prior to 
holding an open season.130  Neptune asserted that this would 
provide assurance of adequate interest in the project, giving it 
“legitimacy and momentum.”131  Neptune argued that these 
bilateral contract rates would be capped by the same market 
forces – the purchaser’s opportunity costs – that would cap rates 
during the open season.132
The Commission rejected this feature of its proposal, 
reasoning that if the project is economically viable, Neptune 
should be able to obtain binding financial commitment through 
open season contracts.
 
133  Also, because the prices would be 
effectively capped by the same forces prior to and during the open 
season, there was no ostensible benefit to Neptune negotiating 
thirty percent of its capacity pre-open season.134  Moreover, the 
Commission declared that, as a matter of policy, all capacity for 
merchant transmission projects should be made available 
through open seasons to ensure its allocation is “transparent, 
nondiscriminatory and fair.”135
Neptune responded by insisting that an open season was not 
essential to ensuring “transparent, non-discriminatory and fair” 
access to capacity on its project, and that market forces would 
dictate that no purchaser pays more than opportunity costs, 
regardless of whether capacity rights are purchased through pre-
open season negotiated transactions or open seasons.
 
136  This is 
particularly true, Neptune argued, because it lacks captive 
customers and is assuming all market risk of the project.137
 
 129. Id. 
  
 130. Neptune I, 96 F.E.R.C. at 61,633-34. 
 131. Id. at 61,634. 
 132. Id. at 61,633-34. 
 133. Id. at 61,634. 
 134. Id. at 61,633-34. 
 135. Id. at 61,634. 
 136. Neptune Reg’l Transmission Sys. (Neptune II), 103 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,213, at 
P 11 (2004). 
 137. Id. 
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Neptune further claimed that it had no incentive to discriminate 
among market participants during its negotiations.138  To support 
their position, both Neptune and intervenor TransÉnergie drew 
comparisons with gas regulation.  TransÉnergie pointed out that 
gas pipelines can pre-sell capacity prior to holding an open 
season; precluding merchant transmission from pre-selling their 
capacity limits their ability to allay risk and hampers project 
development.139  Neptune complained that bidders in pipeline 
open seasons only compete on price, subject to the applicable cost-
based cap (recourse rate) because other terms and conditions are 
already included in the pipeline’s tariff.  In contrast, Neptune’s 
open season bidders’ terms and service were less clearly spelled 
out, needed to be negotiated, and also to be provided under the 
(as yet unknown) terms of the Open Access Transmission Tariff of 
an (as yet to be created Northeastern) ISO/RTO.  These 
complicating factors, Neptune insisted, made interested 
customers less willing to participate in its open season.140
The Commission denied rehearing and continued to reject 
Neptune’s pre-open season contracting proposal.
 
141  Emphasizing 
that the transparency afforded in the open season is essential to 
ensuring all parties are treated fairly, the Commission declared 
that it was “not ready to abandon its policy that all initial 
transmission rights must be sold through an open season.”142  
The Commission found this particularly important where it 
allowed affiliates to participate in the open season, as it did for 
Neptune.143  The Commission nevertheless signaled its 
willingness to consider “other options” to assist merchant 
transmission providers in their quest for innovative ways to add 
transmission to the grid and secure financing for their projects.144
Pointing to its approval of a four-part open season as one 
example, the Commission also suggested Neptune broaden its 
criteria for evaluating transmission capacity bids and offered up 
 
 
 138. Id. at P 12. 
 139. Id. at P 16. 
 140. Id. at P 15. 
 141. Id. at P 17. 
 142. Neptune II, 103 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,213 at P 17. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at P 18. 
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the possibility of developing standard transmission scheduling 
rights contracts.145  Notably, it also signaled its willingness to 
reconsider the open season issue for initial allocation of project 
rights where equity investors and other affiliates do not 
participate.146
3. Northeast Utilities Service Company: Appeasing 
Affiliate Concerns 
 
Similar to its predecessors TransÉnergie and Neptune, 
Northeast Utilities Service Company (“NUSCO”) requested the 
Commission approve negotiated transmission rates on an 
undersea, high-voltage direct-current cable linking New England 
and New York.147  Unlike its predecessors, however, NUSCO was 
affiliated with and controlled the facilities of the regulated entity 
to which it proposed to connect.148  On its first pass, the 
Commission rejected the pricing proposal, with specific 
suggestions.149  Citing NUSCO’s lack of explanation whether any 
affiliated or unaffiliated entity could connect new transmission 
facilities to the project, the Commission emphasized that neither 
NUSCO nor its affiliates should be able to delay competitors from 
interconnecting with the project of the ISO at each end.150  Also 
pointing out that, unlike NUSCO, neither TransÉnergie nor 
Neptune was in a position to shift risk to captive customers, the 
Commission required NUSCO to describe in detail the procedures 
used to ensure that NUSCO assumes full market risk for the 
project, including accounting procedures and codes of conduct.151
 
 145. Id. 
  
The Commission was also troubled by NUSCO’s proposal to 
include its affiliates in the open season for allocating 
transmission rights, whereas TransÉnergie and Neptune 
(originally) had prohibited their affiliates from such 
 146. Id. 
 147. NUSCO I, 97 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,026, 61,071 (2001); Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. 
(NUSCO II), 98 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,310, 62,326 (2002). 
 148. NUSCO I, 97 F.E.R.C. at 61,074. 
 149. Id. at 61,074-75. 
 150. Id. at 61,074. 
 151. Id. 
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participation.152  Consequently, finding the application raised 
“significant affiliate issues,” market power issues such as barriers 
to entry and assumption of risk, concerns regarding the open 
season process and business risk criteria in the application, the 
Commission found the filing deficient and required NUSCO to 
provide additional detail.153  The Commission also rejected 
NUSCO’s proposal for its subsidiary to provide service on a stand-
alone rate schedule, instead finding that, consistent with 
TransÉnergie and Neptune, service should be provided under the 
terms and conditions of the Open Access Transmission Tariff 
(“OATT”) of the RTO that would operate the project.154
The Commission ultimately conditionally accepted NUSCO’s 
application for negotiated rates, after the company submitted 
additional information and revised aspects of its proposal, 
including no longer permitting its affiliates to participate in open 
seasons.
 
155
B. Transitional cases 
  However, plans for what would have been this 300 
MW line were withdrawn in November 2002, after a 
disappointing open season. 
TransÉnergie and other early merchant transmission 
applicants were located in or adjacent to RTOs and ISOs.156  The 
criteria or “guideposts” the Commission crafted to assess 
negotiated rate applications took this factor into account, and the 
precedent discussed above conditioned negotiated rate authority 
on turning facilities over to an RTO to operate and to facilitate 
non-discriminatory open access.157
Within the past five years, however, requests for negotiated 
rate authorization for merchant transmission projects located 
 
 
 152. Id. at 61,074-75. 
 153. See id. at 61,071. 
 154. See NUSCO I, 97 F.E.R.C. at 61,075. 
 155. See NUSCO II, 98 F.E.R.C. at 62,329.  However, plans for what would 
have been this 300 MW line were withdrawn in November 2002, after a 
disappointing open season. See id. at 62,328 n.10. 
 156. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134, at P 35 (2009). 
 157. See, e.g., TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,230, 61,840 (2000); Neptune I, 
96 F.E.R.C. at 61,633; NUSCO I, 97 F.E.R.C. at 61,075. 
33
02 WERNTZMACRO 3/23/2011  6:20 PM 
454 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  28 
 
outside the footprint of an RTO or ISO have increased.158  This 
development is at least partially attributable to the increased 
development of generation from renewable resources and the fact 
that these resources are often located in areas that are remote 
from customers.159  In Sea Breeze,160 the Commission granted a 
request to charge negotiated rates for transmission service over a 
22-mile, 540 MW high voltage direct current transmission line 
(and converter stations) that would run underneath the Strait of 
San Juan de Fuca between Washington State and British 
Columbia, Canada.  In MATL,161
 
 158. See, e.g., Champlain, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,006, at P 3 (2010) (proposing to 
connect locations in Montreal, Quebec, New York City and New England); 
SunZia, 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,162, at P 2 (2010) (proposing to connect sites in New 
Mexico and Arizona); Tres Amigas I, 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,207, at P 4 (2010) 
(proposing to connect in New Mexico all three interconnections in the 
continental United States); Mountain States Transmission Intertie, L.L.C. 
(Mountain States), 127 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,270, at P 3 (2009) (proposing to connect 
locations in Montana and Idaho); Wyo. Colo. Intertie, L.L.C., 127 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,125, at P 2 (2009) (proposing to connect Western Area Power Administration 
with Public Service Company of Colorado); Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 
2 (proposing to connect locations in Idaho and Nevada and Montana and 
Nevada); MATL, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071, at P 2 (2006) (proposing to connect 
locations in Canada and Montana); Sea Breeze, 112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,295, at P 2 
(2005) (proposing to connect locations in Washington state and British 
Columbia). 
 the Commission granted a 
request to charge negotiated rates for a merchant line that would 
run from Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada to Great Falls, Montana.  
In each case the applicant used the ten criteria as a framework to 
present its proposal, noting the distinction from prior cases that 
involved organized markets.  In both cases, the Commission 
either waived certain criteria or applied them flexibly, and 
signaled its receptivity to reconsidering the relevance of all ten 
 159. See MATL, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071 at P 24 (finding MATL proposed “an 
innovative merchant transmission project that will provide a link between two 
regions and allow for efficient and economic access to existing and new 
generation sources, such as newly developing wind farms.”). 
 160. See Sea Breeze, 112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,295 at P 24 (citing NUSCO I, 97 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,026 (2001)). 
 161. See MATL, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071 at P 24 (finding MATL proposed “an 
innovative merchant transmission project that will provide a link between two 
regions and allow for efficient and economic access to existing and new 
generation sources, such as newly developing wind farms.”). 
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criteria for these types of projects.162
 Also noteworthy, lacking an RTO on each end to 
“discipline” or cap negotiated rates, the Commission justified 
granting MATL negotiated rate authority on slightly different 
grounds than it had in prior cases.  The Commission found that 
MATL’s open season process, in which it auctioned off over half of 
the project’s capacity, coupled with the fact that it agreed to be a 
price taker (bid in at zero, willing to take the auction clearing 
price), subject to a floor defined by the current auction price, 
would result in transmission rights being auctioned in an open, 
fair and transparent manner at a price approximating the 
current costs of capital, construction and operation initial rates 
for capacity.
  For example, the 
Commission allowed each of these applicants to serve customers 
under their respective OATTs. 
163  As for MATL’s rates for transmission capacity 
going forward, similar to its rationale in the RTO context, the 
Commission explained that NorthWestern Energy has an 
obligation under its OATT, if requested, to expand capacity at 
cost-based rates in or near the region served by MATL.  
Consequently, the Commission reasoned, MATL’s customers 
would be “likely to pay prices that are no higher than, and 
probably lower than, Northwestern [sic] Energy’s cost of 
expansion.”164
 
 162. See Sea Breeze, 112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,295 at P 17, 22, 27, 32; see MATL, 116 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071 at P 27, 32, 35. 
  The applicant argued that the prices would be 
limited to the differential between the power markets in Montana 
and Alberta. 
 163. See MATL, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071 at P 53. 
 164. See id.  The Commission also pointed out that this is the same approach 
it had initially taken when authorizing market-based rates for certain sellers of 
ancillary services, relying on cost-based rates of transmission providers to limit 
the prices charged by competitors. Id. (citing Avista Corp., 87 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,223 
(1999), order on reh’g, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,136 (1999)).  Note that the applicant had 
argued that the prices would be limited to the differential between the power 
markets in Montana and Alberta. See id. at P 54 (the Commission did not 
discuss this rationale in its determination). 
35
02 WERNTZMACRO 3/23/2011  6:20 PM 
456 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  28 
 
C. Recent Developments: FERC’s Flexible Four-Factor 
Test 
After gaining experience with evaluating proposals for 
negotiated rate authority for merchant transmission projects 
located outside the footprint of organized markets, the 
Commission ultimately settled on a streamlined, flexible 
approach that it concluded would facilitate financing for such 
projects. 
1. Chinook and Zephyr 
In the landmark order on Chinook Power Transmission, 
L.L.C. and Zephyr Power Transmission L.L.C., the Commission: 
(1) whittled its ten factor-test for authorizing negotiated, rather 
than cost-based, rates for transmission down to a simpler, more 
flexible, four-factor test;165 and (2) departed from prior electricity 
precedent and borrowed from the natural gas model to allow 
project developers to pre-subscribe fifty percent of project capacity 
to anchor customers before holding open season auctions to 
allocate the remainder of the capacity.166  While, as discussed 
above, the Commission had rejected pre-open season contracting 
in a prior case, Neptune, the Commission modified its policy to 
help merchant transmission developers surmount the practical 
difficulties they face in financing large projects.167
 
 165. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134, at P 37 (2009). 
  In Chinook, 
the Commission concluded that the financial commitments made 
by anchor customers prior to an open season gave merchant 
transmission providers crucial early support and certainty, 
 166. See id. at P 60.  The Commission subsequently allowed as much as 75 
percent of capacity to be presubscribed before an open season. See Champlain, 
132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,006, at P 45 (2010) (granting request to charge negotiated 
rates for transmission rights on a high voltage direct current merchant 
transmission project linking Montreal, Quebec to the New York City and New 
England area markets).  The Commission allowed presubscription of 75 percent 
capacity in 30-year contracts to help Champlain secure financing, including $3 
billion ARRA loan guarantee from DOE and $800 million private equity; and (2) 
given the project’s specifics, such as few potential open season participants, and 
the applicants’ commitments, including posting of winning bidders, keeping 
books and records, filing financial reports and having its books and records 
audited by an independent auditor. Id. at P 46. 
 167. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 44. 
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enabling them to gain the critical mass necessary to develop these 
projects.168  The Commission emphasized that this approach may 
be particularly beneficial for location-constrained resources.169  
While the Commission signaled its willingness to be more flexible 
regarding capacity allocation outside of the open season context, 
the FPA provided the limits on this flexibility, by precluding 
merchant transmission developers from allocating transmission 
capacity in an unduly discriminatory manner.170
a. Description of the Chinook and Zephyr 
Projects 
 
Chinook proposed to construct a 1000-mile, 500 kV high-
voltage direct current transmission line that would originate in 
Montana and terminate south of Las Vegas, Nevada.171  Zephyr 
proposed to develop a 1100-mile, 500 kV high-voltage direct 
current transmission line from Wyoming to south of Las Vegas, 
Nevada.172  The developers asserted their projects would benefit 
the western power grid by providing transmission capacity to 
transmit approximately 3000 MW of wind-generated electricity to 
load centers in the southwestern United States.173  The proposed 
transmission lines, which would cost approximately three billion 
dollars each, would run parallel to each other along the southern 
portions of Borah, Idaho, to their termination points south of Las 
Vegas.174
b. Presubscription and Open Season 
  Converter stations, to change alternating current to 
direct current and back, would be located at the lines’ respective 
origin, terminus, and in Idaho and Nevada. 
 To defray expenses, Chinook and Zephyr each entered into 
an agreement with a wind generation developer to become an 
 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. at P 2. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 2-3. 
 174. See id 
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“anchor customer” and share developmental costs.175  Chinook 
and Zephyr explained that extensive discussions with numerous 
prospective customers confirmed the need for the project, but no 
one was willing to commit without demonstrable commercial 
support.176  They argued that in the current financial climate, the 
projects would not move forward without anchor customers.177
Consequently, they proposed to subscribe fifty percent of the 
transmission rights to their project to their respective anchor 
customer and then hold open seasons to auction the remaining 
1500 MW of capacity for each line.
 
178  They argued that pre-
subscription of at least fifty percent of each project prior to 
conducting an open season was needed to ensure commercial 
viability.179  They asserted that this amount “strikes a reasonable 
balance between satisfying commercial objectives and still 
providing all other customers an opportunity to bid for capacity in 
the open season.”180  A precedent agreement with one large 
customer, they insisted, would simplify negotiations and expedite 
the development process.181  They warned that pre-subscriptions 
with multiple small entities would increase the risk that one or 
more entities would back out, leaving Chinook and Zephyr 
contractually committed to other entities, but lacking support 
needed to complete the projects.182
 Chinook and Zephyr asserted that the anchor customers’ 
precedent agreements would be used as a model for the open 
season customers’ precedent agreements and that any customer 
in the open season willing to commit to a twenty-five-year term 
for any megawatt amount would receive the same rate and terms 
as the anchor customers.
 
183
 
 175. See id. at P 10. 
  They proposed that if there were 
more successful bids than transmission capacity, they would 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 12. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
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either prorate the awarded open season capacity rights or enlarge 
the projects, if feasible.184
c. Lack of Market Power and Negotiated Rate 
Authority 
 
Chinook and Zephyr contended that they lacked market 
power and only willing potential customers would seek 
transmission rights on these lines.185  They pointed out that they 
are merchant transmission developers with no captive customers 
and, as they are located outside of an organized market, i.e., not 
located in an RTO or ISO, there are no members of those 
organizations to subsidize any costs of the proposed projects.186  
Chinook and Zephyr argued that there are a number of proposed 
projects in the Western Interconnection that will compete with 
these projects and customers will not sign onto a project that does 
not offer competitive transmission prices.187  They asserted that 
this guarantees that the negotiated rates will be just and 
reasonable.188  They further asserted that customers will be 
protected by incumbent transmission providers’ obligations to 
expand capacity upon request in the vicinity of the projects and 
the availability of cost-based transmission rates for service over 
such expansions.189  They contended that customers are likely to 
pay prices no higher than the neighboring transmission providers’ 
expansion costs.190  In addition, they asserted that the anchor 
shipper selection process and open season commitments ensure 
the “open, fair and transparent” allocation of transmission rights 
at a price around the current cost of construction, operation and 
capital.191
 
 184. See id. 
 
 185. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 17. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 18. 
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d. Commission Disposition: The Four-Factor Test 
Significantly, in Chinook, the Commission consolidated and 
refined the ten criteria for granting negotiated rate authority for 
merchant transmission projects, particularly where the criteria 
did not suit merchant transmission projects located outside the 
footprint of an organized market.192  Declaring an “evolution in 
the Commission’s policy,” the Commission jettisoned the 
requirement that all initial capacity must be allocated through a 
pre-construction open season, which had formerly precluded use 
of the anchor shipper model used in the natural gas context.193  
Acknowledging the practical difficulties merchant transmission 
developers face in financing large projects – including the 
“chicken-and-egg problem” that generators, purchasers and 
transmission owners are all loathe to be the first to commit to a 
project – the Commission concluded that anchor shippers’ 
financial commitments prior to an open season could provide 
“crucial early support and certainty to merchant transmission 
developers, which enables them to gain the critical mass 
necessary to develop these projects.”194
The revised four-part analysis focuses on the following four 
“areas of concern:”  (1) justness and reasonableness of rates; (2) 
potential for undue discrimination;
 
195 (3) potential for undue 
preference, including affiliate preference; and (4) regional 
reliability and operational efficiency requirements.196
 
 192. See id. at P 37.  The Commission explained its intent was to “‘re-focus’ the 
Commission’s analysis on the mandate of section 205 and the underlying areas 
of concern that the Commission seeks to address in its evaluation of negotiated 
rate applications for merchant transmission projects.” Id. at P 37. 
  The first 
three factors track the requirements of section 205 of the FPA, 
 193. See id. at P 42. 
 194. See id. at P 44 (citing comments in Docket No. AD08-13).  Note that the 
Commission’s rationale reflects Neptune’s prior arguments attempting to 
persuade the Commission to allow pre-open season contracts.  In Chinook, the 
Commission also pared down the requirement that facilities must be turned 
over to an RTO/ISO. Id. 
 195. Generally speaking, “[d]iscrimination is undue when there is a difference 
in rates or services among similarly situated customers that is not justified by 
some legitimate factor.” El Paso Natural Gas Co., 104 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,045, at P 
115 (2003). 
 196. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 37. 
40https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/2
02 WERNTZMACRO 3/23/2011  6:20 PM 
2011] LET’S MAKE A DEAL 461 
 
and the fourth factor reflects the imperative that transmission be 
reliable (EPAct 2005 enhanced this authority) and efficient.197  In 
evaluating whether negotiated rates are just and reasonable, the 
Commission announced that it will take into consideration: 
whether the merchant transmission owner assumed the full 
market risk and is not building within the region of its own or 
affiliate’s transmission system, to assure there are no captive 
customers to subsidize the project.  The Commission will also 
consider whether the merchant transmission developer: already 
owns transmission facilities in the region where the project will 
be located and what alternatives customers have; is capable of 
erecting barriers to competitors’ entry; and would have any 
incentive to withhold capacity.198
For example, negotiated rates may be appropriate when the 
service on a neighboring public utility under cost-of-service rates 
– essentially capped at the utility’s cost of expansion – can 
provide a reasonable alternative.  A further check on the 
negotiated rates could exist where the price customers are willing 
to pay for transmission service is disciplined by the difference in 
generation prices at the ends of the line (i.e., the market price of 
generation on either side of the line).
  The Commission further 
reiterated its prior rationale for approving negotiated rates: 
199
Merchant transmission providers retaining ownership and 
control of their projects are still required to create firm tradable 
secondary transmission rights, as well as an OASIS through 
which customers may buy and sell those rights.
 
200
As for the second area of concern, preventing undue 
discrimination, the Commission stated that it primarily considers 
the following two factors: (1) the merchant transmission 
provider’s open season; and (2) its OATT commitments (or, 
commitment to turn operational control over to the RTO/ISO, 
 
 
 197. See id. at P 53 (explaining that “[b]ecause merchant transmission is 
subject to mandatory reliability requirements, separate reliability requirements 
no longer seem necessary.”) (citation omitted). 
 198. See id. at P 38. 
 199. See id. at P 38 n.26. 
 200. See id. at P 39. 
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where applicable).201  The Commission explained that, to the 
developer, open seasons are important for determining the extent 
of interest in the project and whether the project needs to be 
resized.202  For customers, open seasons must be “fair, 
transparent and non-discriminatory,”203 and the Commission 
declared that it would continue its practice of requiring 
developers to file reports shortly after holding an open seasons, to 
provide transparency in the initial allocation of transmission 
rights as well as the basis for an entity to file a complaint alleging 
undue discrimination.204  At a minimum, the reports are to 
include the terms of the open season, including the notice period, 
the identity of the party (or parties) that purchased capacity; and 
the price, amount and term of capacity purchase.205  The open 
season reporting requirement and customer complaints will 
continue to be the main tools for preventing merchant 
transmission developers from unduly discriminating among 
potential customers.206
Notably, the Commission acknowledged that its one hundred 
percent allocation of initial capacity in a pre-construction open 
season requirement had become “unduly rigid and inflexible.”
 
207  
The Commission stated that it would evaluate on a case-by-case 
basis any proposal to allocate some or all initial capacity outside 
of an open season, reasoning that its continued reliance on the 
post-open season reporting requirement and complaint process 
should provide sufficient transparency and protection to 
customers where the merchant transmission owner presubscribes 
a portion of its capacity to an anchor customer.208
After the pre-construction open season, merchant 
transmission projects located in or adjacent to RTOs/ISOs are “to 
consider” turning over operational control of their facilities to the 
RTO/ISO; merchant transmission developers not located in or 
 
 
 201. See id. 
 202. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 41. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. at P 43. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. at P 45. 
 207. Id. at P 42. 
 208. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C.¶ 61,134 at P 45-49. 
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within the vicinity of an RTO/ISO must file and provide non-
discriminatory service pursuant to an Order 890-compliant 
OATT.  Any deviations from the pro forma OATT will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis, as it had in MATL.209
The third factor, undue preference and affiliate concerns, is 
implicated when the merchant transmission owner is affiliated 
with either the anchor customer, open season participants, and/or 
customers that take service on the merchant transmission 
facility.
 
210  In particular, the Commission emphasized that it will 
apply a “higher level of scrutiny” when the anchor shipper is 
affiliated with the merchant transmission developer out of 
concern that the affiliate’s captive ratepayers could subsidize the 
merchant project inappropriately.211  Similarly, while not 
imposing a blanket prohibition on affiliates from participating in 
open seasons, the Commission nevertheless expressed concern 
that affiliates could be offered unduly lower rates than non-
affiliates or that the merchant transmission developer could 
charge higher rates to a regulated entity with captive customers, 
harming captive customers by compelling them to subsidize the 
project, as well as effectively blocking entry by other merchant 
transmission developers, thus limiting competition.212  For post-
open season purchases of transmission rights on the merchant 
line, the Commission requires all transactions to be transparent 
and posted on the relevant entity’s OASIS.213
As for the fourth criterion, regional reliability and 
operational efficiency, the Commission explained that these 
concerns had been its impetus for requiring merchant 
transmission developers to turn facilities over to the relevant 
RTO/ISO in the past.
 
214
 
 209. See id. at P 47. 
 However, FERC explained, now that 
merchant transmission providers are subject to mandatory 
reliability requirements, separate reliability requirements no 
longer seem necessary.  Merchant transmission developers are 
required to comport with North American Electric Reliability 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. at P 49. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 52. 
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Corporation (“NERC”) and any regional reliability council and are 
encouraged to participate in Order 890 regional planning 
processes.215
Using these four factors to assess the applications, the 
Commission conditionally authorized Chinook and Zephyr to 
charge negotiated rates for transmission rights on the respective 
projects: “We re-affirm our commitment to fostering the 
development of merchant transmission projects through our 
adoption of a more flexible approach toward negotiated rate 
applications that simultaneously acknowledges the financing 
realities faced by merchant transmission developers and carries 
out the Commission’s customer-protection mandate.”
 
216
2. Tres Amigas 
 
This past year, the Commission acted on a groundbreaking 
proposal, called Tres Amigas, which “has the potential to expand 
markets and to provide new and significant trading opportunities 
to location-constrained resources in a part of the country that is 
rich in potential for renewable energy development.”217  On 
December 8, 2009, Tres Amigas LLC (“Tres Amigas”) filed a 
request for authorization to charge negotiated rates for 
transmission rights on a proposed merchant transmission project 
that would utilize innovative technology to link, for the first time 
in history, the three asynchronous transmission interconnections 
in the continental United States: the Eastern Interconnect, the 
Western Electric Coordinating Council (“WECC”), and Electric 
Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”).218
 
 215. See id. 
  The Project would 
 216. Id. 
 217. Tres Amigas I, 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,207, at P 1 (2010), order on motion for 
clarification, 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,281 (2010), reh’g denied, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,233 
(2010). 
 218. On the same day, Tres Amigas also filed a related petition for disclaimer 
of Commission jurisdiction over the transmission facilities and entities that 
would interconnect the proposed Tres Amigas superstation project with ERCOT.  
Petition for Disclaimer of Jurisdiction, Tres Amigas (2009) (No. EL10-22).  
Historically, because ERCOT facilities are not used for transmission and sales of 
electricity in interstate commerce, FERC has lacked jurisdiction over ERCOT 
facilities, except under sections 210 and 211 of the FPA. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824i, 824j 
(2006).  The Commission denied Tres Amigas’ request to disclaim jurisdiction. 
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consist of a three-way alternating current (AC)/DC transmission 
interconnection “superstation” in New Mexico, near the Texas 
border.  In making its pitch for negotiated rates, Tres Amigas 
argued that cost-based rates would not be realistic for the project 
because it has no captive customers, there is no RTO to recover 
the project costs, the beneficiaries of the project are spread 
throughout all three interconnections, and the project risks 
exceed typical cost-based project risks.219
On March 18, 2010, using the four-prong Chinook analysis, 
the Commission granted Tres Amigas’ request for negotiated 
rates, “subject to a number of conditions designed to ensure that 
the goals of open access are protected and that the rates for 
transmission service on the project remain just and 
reasonable.”
 
220  First, the Commission determined that Tres 
Amigas qualified for negotiated rates because it would be a new 
entrant in the regional market for transmission services, with no 
captive customers, and would assume full market risk of the 
project.221 Articulating a voluntarism principle, the Commission 
emphasized that if customers voluntarily agree to take service, 
neighboring utilities are not obligated to construct transmission 
facilities to the merchant transmission project, and the project 
does not require mandatory use of the transmission system or 
impose a system benefit charge, this indicates that the developer 
has assumed full market risk.222 The Commission explained that 
the reason it assesses whether the merchant transmission 
provider has assumed full market risk is to protect customers 
from inappropriate cross-subsidization.223
 
Tres Amigas L.L.C., 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,205, reh’g denied, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,232 
(2010). 
  Utilities that 
voluntarily decide to construct transmission facilities to the 
project, like existing neighboring facilities, are under no 
obligation to connect to or purchase service from Tres Amigas, so 
 219. See Application for Authorization to Sell Transmission at Negotiated 
Rates and Related Relief (2009) (No. ER10-396, at 3-4). 
 220. Tres Amigas III, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,233 at P 13 n.6 (citing Tres Amigas I, 
130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,207). 
 221. See Tres Amigas I, 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,207 at P 51. 
 222. See Tres Amigas III, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,233 at P 18, 19, 22. 
 223. Id. at P 22. 
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there is no cross-subsidization of the merchant transmission 
project.224
In addition, the Commission determined that the project’s 
negotiated rates would be just and reasonable because it found 
checks on Tres Amigas’ ability to develop and exercise market 
power, singling out the following controls: the developer’s 
commitment to expand its facilities at cost-based rates if the 
market will not support a merchant upgrade; the Commission’s 
requirement that Tres Amigas seek Commission approval of its 
open season, via filing an independently audited post-open season 
report, and any anchor customer transactions.
 
225  The 
Commission also relied on Tres Amigas’ various commitments, 
such as its promise to file an OATT that provides its open season 
terms and seek Commission approval prior to selling project 
capacity to project owners or affiliates or selling an equity 
interest to a utility with captive customers.226  Furthermore, the 
Commission found that a number of factors would provide long-
term price discipline, striking the “appropriate balance” between 
financing realities and long-term market power.227
Under the second prong, consistent with Chinook, the 
Commission granted Tres Amigas authority to enter into anchor 
customer agreements for up to fifty percent of the project’s initial 
capacity.
 
228  However, notably, it modified the open season 
auction process to make available at all times all the initial 
capacity not purchased by an anchor customer.229
 
 224. See id. at P 24. 
  In addition, to 
allay the potential for undue discrimination, the Commission 
required the merchant transmission developer to offer the same 
 225. See id. at P 25. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See id. at P 26 n.54.  In particular, the Commission listed the factors: 
competition from holders of secondary transmission rights; options to purchase 
capacity on existing interties, capped at the cost of expanding these interties; a 
new entrant’s cost to construct an intertie between any or all of the 
interconnections; the difference in the price of generation in the markets the 
project connects; and the cost of expanding the project at cost of service rates 
once the project is built. Id. 
 228. See Tres Amigas I, 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,207 at P 57. 
 229. See id. at P 54.  Tres Amigas had proposed to withhold twenty percent. 
Id. at P 59. 
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rates and terms it offers to anchor customers to any customer in 
the open season auction.230
As for the third prong, the Commission concluded that the 
project did not present any undue preference or affiliate concerns 
because the applicant promised to seek prior Commission 
authorization for any affiliate transaction.
 
231  Fourth, Tres 
Amigas promised to participate in the Order 890 planning process 
and comply with WECC requirements, so the Commission 
determined that the project met regional reliability and 
operational efficiency requirements.232
D. Limits of Flexibility 
 
In 2009, Mount States Transmission Intertie, LLC, Mountain 
States, a wholly-owned subsidiary of utility NorthWestern 
Corporation (“NorthWestern”), together with NorthWestern filed 
a petition for declaratory order requesting negotiated rate 
authority for a proposed transmission project.233  They also 
proposed to give customers that were already in NorthWestern’s 
existing transmission interconnection queue a priority on the 
proposed project if open season demand were to exceed the 
capacity of the project configuration.234
 
 230. See id. at P 61.  The Commission subsequently clarified that Tres Amigas 
is only required to offer other potential customers the same rates and terms as it 
may negotiate with the anchor customer on a one-time basis after the anchor 
customer agreement has been approved by the Commission. Tres Amigas L.L.C. 
(Tres Amigas II), 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,281, at P 14 (2010). 
  The applicants stated 
that NorthWestern’s existing generation capacity significantly 
exceeds its load, rendering NorthWestern an exporting control 
 231. See Tres Amigas I, 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,207 at P 94. 
 232. See id. at P 97. 
 233. See Mountain States, 127 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,270, at P 1 (2009). 
 234. See id. at P 1, 7.  Mountain States contemplated three potential 
configurations for the project: (1) a 433 mile, 500 kV line from Townsend, 
Montana to Borah, Idaho; (2) a 362 mile, 345 kV line from Townsend to Borah; 
or (3) a 268 mile, 230 kV line from Mill Creek, Montana to Borah. See Petition 
for Declaratory Order on Rate Treatments and Open Season for Transmission 
Export Project and Request for Expedited Treatment, at 3-5 (filed Jan. 15, 2009) 
(No. EL09-30-000).  The developer, Mountain States, proposed to determine the 
ultimate size and configuration of the project through a two-stage open season 
that would result in binding customer commitments. See id. at 5, 11-12. 
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area.235  Consequently, they proposed to develop the project as a 
stand-alone transmission system, rather than an expansion of the 
NorthWestern system, as previously anticipated, to protect 
NorthWestern’s existing customers from subsidizing the cost of a 
new transmission facility to serve off-system markets.236  They 
asserted that Mountain States had no captive customers and 
would assume full market and financial risk for the project.237  
Mountain States would provide transmission service under an 
Order 890-compliant OATT since the project would not be located 
within or adjacent to an RTO/ISO.238
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC and PPL Montana, LLC (collectively, 
“PPL”) vigorously contested the application for negotiated rates, 
arguing that rather than process PPL’s 2004 request for 
transmission service under the OATT, with cost-based rates, 
NorthWestern sought to force PPL to compete for transmission 
service at rates that would depend on the number of customers 
who would participate in the open season for affiliate Mountain 
States project and the ultimate size of the transmission 
facility.
 
239  Contending that the proposal raised affiliate concerns 
such as cross-subsidization as well as rate pancaking issues, PPL 
urged the Commission to deny the request.240  PPL emphasized 
that, unlike the Mountain States project, Commission precedent 
on granting negotiated rate authority involved cases where either 
the proposed lines were not interconnected with transmission 
systems owned by affiliates or an RTO/ISO was to operate and 
schedule the lines or the proposed projects.241
While the Commission reaffirmed its commitment to 
developing a “new transmission infrastructure that is essential to 
 
 
 235. See Mountain States, 127 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,270 at P 4. 
 236. See id. at P 5. 
 237. See id. at P 6. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. at P 12-13. 
 240. See id. at P 14-18.  Because it denied the request to charge negotiated 
rates on the proposed project, the Commission declared the issue of whether 
Mountain State could grant customers from NorthWestern’s queue a tie-
breaking priority in Mountain State’s open season to be moot. Id. at P 65 n.40. 
 241. See Mountain States, 127 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,270 at P 14 (citing Neptune, 96 
F.E.R.C. at 61,633; Sea Breeze, 112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,295, at P 16 (2005); MATL, 
116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071, at P 14 (2006)). 
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access and deliver power from locational constrained resources 
and to meet our Nation’s future energy requirements,”242 the 
Commission nevertheless denied the request for negotiated 
rates.243  Emphasizing the affiliate relationship between 
Mountain States and NorthWestern, the Commission found 
petitioners had not shown that negotiated rate authority for the 
project would be just and reasonable (as required by the FPA) per 
the first prong of Chinook analysis.244  The Commission 
explained that its just and reasonable evaluation “first looks to 
whether the merchant transmission owner has assumed the full 
market risk for the cost of constructing a particular transmission 
project and is not building within the footprint of its own (or an 
affiliate’s) traditionally regulated system.”245  Comparing 
Chinook with Mountain States, the Commission noted that the 
merchant transmission developers in Chinook were new entrants 
with no affiliates in the footprints of their respective transmission 
projects.  In contrast, the Mountain States project would be 
largely located within its affiliate NorthWestern’s traditionally 
regulated transmission system.246  The Commission further noted 
that NorthWestern had played a “substantial” role in the 
preliminary developmental stages of the project, undermining the 
assertion that Mountain States had assumed full risk of the 
project and giving Mountain States the appearance of an undue 
preference.247  In addition, the Commission found that the 
absence of meaningful competition between affiliates 
NorthWestern and Mountain States would concentrate their 
control over transmission in and around Montana, potentially 
increasing the incumbent utility’s market power.248
Furthermore, whereas in prior cases the Commission had 
found that a neighboring transmission system’s obligation to 
expand functioned essentially as a cap on negotiated rates, 
buttressing the determination that negotiated rates are just and 
 
 
 242. See id. at P 58. 
 243. See id. 
 244. See id. at P 57 n.24 (citing Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 (2009)). 
 245. Id. at P 60 n.29 (citing Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134 at P 33-37). 
 246. See id. at P 60. 
 247. See Mountain States, 127 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,270 at P 61. 
 248. See id. at P 62. 
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reasonable,249 the Commission concluded that this disciplining 
force was lacking in Mountain States.250  Granting Mountain 
States’ negotiated rate authority would actually create a 
disincentive for NorthWestern’s to expand its system at cost-
based rates under its OATT, the Commission explained.251  This 
is because NorthWestern would have incentive to favor its 
affiliate Mountain States by withholding capacity and/or delaying 
the timely expansion of its system in response to transmission 
service requests.252  Indeed, the fact that PPL’s request for 
transmission service back in 2004 had not yet led to the 
construction of transmission capacity lent credence to the 
Commission’s rationale, and also discredited the value of 
NorthWestern’s pledge to honor its OATT obligation to expand.253  
The Commission found that the lack of an independent operator, 
such as an RTO/ISO, in the vicinity of the project exacerbated 
concerns about the affiliate relationship.  Consequently, while, for 
example, the Commission had allowed the merchant transmission 
provider NUSCO to charge negotiated rates, even though it would 
interconnect to an affiliate with captive customers, this was 
because, contrary to Mountain States, NUSCO would turn control 
of the facilities over to an ISO that would ensure the merchant 
did not act unduly discriminatorily or erect barriers to entry.254
Another example where the Commission recently reached its 
limits of flexibility is Sunzia Transmission LLC.
 
255
 
 249. See, e.g., TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,230, 61,839 (2000). 
  In Sunzia, 
the Commission denied without prejudice authority to charge 
negotiated rates where the applicant failed three of the four 
prongs of the four-prong test, proposed presubscription of up to 
one hundred percent of capacity, possibly allocating some to 
affiliates, and refused to offer the same presubscription deal to 
other customers in the open season. 
 250. See Mountain States, 127 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,270 at P 63. 
 251. See id. 
 252. See id. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. at P 64 n.39 (citing NUSCO II, 98 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,310 (2002)). 
 255. See generally Sunzia, 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,162 (2010). 
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IV. SUMMARY AND RUMINATIONS 
As this survey of Commission precedent reveals, the 
Commission has borrowed concepts from its market-based rate 
program256 and natural gas regulation to devise a creative and 
flexible approach to assessing negotiated rate authority for 
merchant transmission.  The four-factor test announced in 
Chinook, the approach du jour, is not only flexible, but also 
provides a consistent framework for assessing disparate and 
wide-ranging merchant transmission proposals.  Significantly, 
the four-factor test incorporates and balances at least three 
Commission concerns: (1) the FPA’s consumer protection 
mandates; (2) the financing realities faced by merchant 
transmission developers; and (3) the Commission’s requirements 
that transmission providers afford customers open access to 
transmission facilities.  In applying the test, the Commission has 
clearly “demonstrated a commitment to fostering the 
development of merchant transmission projects where reasonable 
and meaningful protections are in place to preserve open access 
principles and to ensure that the resulting transmission rates are 
just and reasonable.”257
With regard to consumer protection, the rationale behind 
negotiated rates for merchant transmission essentially parallels 
the justification for negotiated rates in the natural gas context.  
Natural gas pipelines are allowed to charge negotiated rates for 
transporting natural gas because the customer has the option of 
requesting the pipeline to provide service under its cost-based 
recourse rate, which essentially caps the rate for transporting 
natural gas.
 
258
 
 256. Note that it is the broad concepts, such as evaluating market power and 
ongoing oversight, rather than the particular tests, which the Commission has 
imported into the merchant transmission context. See Tres Amigas III, 132 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,233, at P 31, 68 (2010) (dismissing objection that FERC had not 
applied the rigorous market power tests used to evaluate generator requests for 
market-based rate authority to assess the merchant project). 
  Where negotiated rate authority for merchant 
transmission is concerned, at least theoretically, the generator 
customer has the option of requesting transmission service, and 
 257. SunZia, 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,162 at P 38. 
 258. Alternatives to Traditional Cost-of-Service Ratemaking for Natural Gas 
Pipelines, 74 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,076, 61,236 (1996). 
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expansion if necessary to provide service, at cost-based rates from 
its incumbent utility provider.259  The only ostensible difference 
between these two regimes is that in the merchant transmission 
context, the cost-based provider and the merchant transmission 
provider would be different entities, as opposed to a single 
natural gas pipeline.260
The Commission’s approach to merchant transmission 
reflects an effort to reconcile its traditional obligation under the 
FPA to protect consumers with the current need to encourage 
third-party investment in the transmission grid.  Consequently, 
as the above discussion reveals, the Commission has recognized 
and attempted to accommodate the financing difficulties 
merchant transmission developers face, by, for example, changing 
its policy to allow pre-open season contracting for transmission 
capacity.  The Commission has nevertheless imposed several 
critical requirements on these projects to ensure that, consistent 
with the FPA, service is provided on a just and reasonable and 
not unduly discriminatory basis. 
 
These obligations include, first, equal opportunity to obtain 
service at the outset of the project.  If there are anchor customers, 
the merchant transmission provider must offer the same terms of 
those agreements to other customers.  Also, reflecting natural gas 
precedent, there must be a non-discriminatory, fair and 
transparent open season – or at least something comparable to an 
open season261
 
 259. See TransÉnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,230, 61,838-89 (2000). 
 – with sufficient notice, so all customers have the 
opportunity to obtain service on the merchant line on the same or 
similar terms.  In order to be fair and transparent, the open 
season processes must be published before the open season 
begins.  This includes publishing rules on who may bid, 
description of the bidding process, what a bid must include, how 
bids will be selected and how capacity will be apportioned if there 
 260. See, e.g., MATL, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071, at P 52 (2006) (“In summary, the 
Commission found in TransÉnergie that negotiated rate authority could be 
granted to a merchant transmission facility interconnected with an RTO given 
the cap effectively created by the difference in LMP prices on each end of the 
merchant line and the expansion cost cap.”). 
 261. See, e.g., Conjunction L.L.C., 108 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,090, ¶ 61,090 (2004) 
(finding Requests for Proposals (“RFP”) that are open to the public and fair in 
transparent may constitute an acceptable open season). 
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is a plethora of interest or tie bids.  To further enhance 
transparency, the Commission also requires merchant project 
developers to disclose their selection rationale in an open season 
report.262 It also bears emphasizing that an important purpose of 
the open season is to judge the extent of market interest in the 
project, which factors into how to decide the extent of the project, 
i.e., right sizing.263
Second, terms of service must be standard and transparent.  
Service must be provided under an OATT, either that of the RTO 
at or near the vicinity of the project, or, if not, the project must 
provide the service under its own OATT.
  This helps guarantee there is sufficient 
transmission capacity to meet customers’ needs, and also protects 
the merchant transmission developer’s interest in not 
overbuilding. 
264
Third, there must be a transparent opportunity for customers 
subsequently to obtain capacity: the merchant transmission 
facility must create tradable firm secondary transmission rights, 
  This makes 
merchant transmission providers subject to the open access 
requirements of Order Nos. 888 and 890, like all transmission 
providers subject to Commission jurisdiction.  This is consistent 
with natural gas regulation, which also requires pipelines to 
provide open access transportation service.  Pipelines, which are 
like merchant transmission facilities in that they are stand-alone 
rather than vertically-integrated, must offer firm and 
interruptible service under a Commission-approved, generally 
applicable tariff. 
 
 262. The Commission has demonstrated sensitivity to the complexity of bid 
evaluation, however, by allowing providers to use non-price considerations that 
implicate financial risk, such as levels and type of insurance. See TransEnergie 
II, 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,347 at 61,167 n.5 (citing Open Season Report, June 9, 2000, 
Attach. 1, at 6). 
 263. TransEnergie I, 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,230, 61,839.  Indeed, after the open 
season, some projects were re-sized, such as Neptune’s. See Neptune II, 102 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,213, at P 3-5 (2004) (discussing impact of dismal open season on 
timing of various phases of the project as initially proposed). 
 264. See, e.g., Neptune I, 96 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,147, 61,633 (2001) (denying 
Neptune’s request for waiver of the requirement to provide service under a 
Order No. 888 pro forma tariff). But see PSEG Energy Res. & Trade, 123 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,001, at P 28 (2008) (allowing a generation tie line facility to serve 
its sole generation customer in accordance with its contract and defer open 
access until receiving a third party request for service on the tie line). 
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which must be posted on an OASIS.  The Commission extolled 
this as a critical feature of the original merchant transmission 
proposal, TransEnergie, finding that a vibrant secondary market 
would enhance competition in both the source and sink markets.  
The Commission also required the developer to specify procedures 
for customers to reassign rights and to follow the posting 
requirements in Order No. 889.  This is consistent with natural 
gas regulation, which operates under a physical rights model – 
firm customers on interstate pipelines are allowed to release their 
capacity to other shippers via auction or the pipeline’s electronic 
bulletin board or through a bilaterally negotiated transaction, 
which must be posted on the electronic bulletin board for 
informational purposes.  As for tradable financial rights, posting 
firm secondary transmission rights is also consistent with the 
way financial transmission rights are treated in organized 
markets. 
Fourth, consistent with the Commission’s market-based rate 
program and natural gas regulation, the merchant transmission 
provider must address affiliate concerns to guard against undue 
preference.  As discussed above, the early projects proposed to 
appease affiliate concerns by not allowing affiliates to participate 
in the open season.  Subsequent projects proposed measures to 
prevent affiliate abuse if affiliates were included in their open 
season, such as hiring an independent consultant or auditor to 
evaluate sealed bids at the end of the open season period.265
Having said this, and because the Commission’s approach to 
merchant transmission has so recently evolved and is largely 
untested in the courts, there remain certain challenges that may 
bear further consideration.  First, there is an inherent tension 
between the Commission’s open access policy and the use of 
anchor shippers.  How much capacity is it just and reasonable to 
allocate prior to an open season?  While the Commission has 
permitted as high as seventy five percent of capacity to be pre-
subscribed,
 
266
 
 265. See, e.g., Conjunction L.L.C., 108 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,090 at P 13; Sea Breeze, 
112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,295, at P 29 (2005); MATL, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071 at P 35, 41; 
Linden VFT, L.L.C., 119 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,066, at P 25, order on clarification, 120 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,242 (2007). 
 the outcome of that case may have been influenced 
 266. See Champlain, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,006, at P 47 (2010). 
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by the applicant’s insistence that such a high percentage was 
necessary to obtain ARRA financing.  Because certainty enhances 
efficiency, however, the Commission may want to consider 
explicitly establishing a limit, even if it is a “soft cap” that leaves 
open the possibility that extraordinary circumstances (or some 
other standard) could warrant a higher percentage in particular 
cases. 
Additionally, it seems probable that the Commission will be 
asked at some juncture whether the existing approach provides 
sufficient protection against the exercise of monopoly power.  
When initially approving a merchant transmission developer’s 
negotiated rate application, arguably the Commission need not be 
overly concerned with market power issues.  This is because, as 
the Commission has held, market power is initially checked by 
the incumbent utilities’ ability to expand to provide new service, 
and, at least theoretically, other merchant transmission providers 
and their investors may step up to fund competing projects.267  
Once the merchant transmission project is built, however, market 
power issues may become more acute.  Although conceivably its 
customers could seek other transmission alternatives, such as 
requesting the incumbent public utility to build a new competing 
line, or purchase generation elsewhere, in practice this might not 
prove to be a viable alternative.268
 
 267. Interview with David Mead, Economist, FERC (Jan. 13, 2011) (on file 
with author). 
  For example, a new line could 
be cost prohibitive or the new line could not be built in sufficient 
time to serve the customer’s needs or the customer could be 
obligated to purchase energy from a renewable resource to meet 
its RPS requirement, but competing generation from these 
sources is not available except as provided by the merchant 
transmission line.  Where a line traverses more than one state, as 
in Chinook/Zephyr, it becomes more difficult to build an 
alternative to the original line because the customer would likely 
have to negotiate with more than one public utility/transmission 
provider and face more regulatory hurdles. 
 268. Cf. Mountain States, 127 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,270, at P 12 (2009) (noting that 
customer requested interconnection with incumbent utility and waited in the 
queue for over 5 years). 
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At least two potential solutions to this dilemma are ongoing 
monitoring, akin to what the Commission employs in its market-
based rate program, and an “open tap” policy, which would 
require the transmission provider to allow expansion of the line to 
serve a new customer.269  The Commission already has the basic 
tools for monitoring in place, including requiring transparent 
secondary trading on the transmission provider’s OASIS and a 
division devoted to market oversight and enforcement.  
Furthermore, akin to pipelines, merchant transmission providers 
file open season reports and, as in the market-based rate 
program, merchant transmission providers also file electronic 
quarterly reports detailing their transactions.270  As for an open 
tap policy, it may be appropriate to require the merchant 
transmission provider to permit expansion of the original 
merchant transmission facilities if needed to serve a new 
customer.271
In addition, because the merchant transmission provider is 
linking two pricing regions, it is enhancing competition, and 
helping the prices converge between the two regions.  The 
transmission provider’s negotiated rate, however, is based on the 
spread between the two regions.  Accordingly, the transmission 
provider has an incentive to keep the price differentials between 
the two regions high.
  This would further the Commission’s open access 
goals. 
272  This tendency can be tempered, 
however, through ongoing monitoring.273
 
 269. Interview with David Mead, supra note 267. 
 
 270. See, e.g., Chinook, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,134, at P 9 (2009). 
 271. Some applicants have offered to expand, if feasible, and the Commission 
has accepted this representation. See MATL, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071, at P 24 
(2006); see also Tres Amigas III, 132 FERC ¶ 61,233, at P 41 (2010) (finding Tres 
Amigas’ offer to expand its facility at cost-based rates if the needed expansion is 
not supported by negotiated rates provides customers with one of a number of 
cost-based alternatives). 
 272. Interview with Partha Malvadkar, Economist, FERC (Mar. 15, 2011) (on 
file with author). 
 273. Note that the Commission has an active office of Market Oversight and 
Enforcement.  Also, to aid transparency and facilitate liquidity, the Commission 
already requires secondary trading on OASIS. See, e.g., Tres Amigas I, 130 
F.E.R.C. § 61,207, at P 80 (2010) (accepting applicant’s commitment to establish 
an OASIS to enable the trading of secondary transmission rights); Chinook, 126 
F.E.R.C. at P 51, 54 (requiring all purchases of transmission rights on a 
merchant transmission line after the open season to be conducted transparently 
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Finally, there is a separate line of cases, involving “gen-tie” 
lines, which, while distinct from the merchant transmission 
context, have raised related open access, undue discrimination, 
and potential market power issues.274  Whereas a merchant 
transmission line is built to serve third parties, a gen-tie is a line 
built and owned by the generator to connect its generation 
resources to the transmission grid.  It serves itself, essentially.275  
Because the generator builds the line to serve its own needs, and 
not those of third parties, the Commission has permitted the 
generator to dedicate one hundred percent of the gen-tie’s 
capacity to its own needs, as long as the generator can 
demonstrate that it actually needs or has specific pre-existing 
plans to develop generation that will utilize all of this capacity to 
transmit its generation to the grid.276  If a generation developer 
constructs a gen-tie with capacity greater than its immediate 
needs, in anticipation of expanding its own generation in the 
future, and a third party wants access, then the generator must 
make the capacity available to the third party until it needs the 
capacity to serve its own generation.277
 
and posted on the relevant transmission owner’s OASIS; both Chinook and 
Zephyr committed to establishing a website and ultimately an OASIS to enable 
the trading of secondary transmission rights). 
  Again, because merchant 
transmission is built to serve third parties, this differs from the 
way that merchant transmission is handled.  As we have seen, at 
least to date, the Commission has not allowed all capacity on a 
 274. See, e.g., Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 127 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,179, at P 17 (2009); 
Milford Wind Power Corridor, L.L.C. (Milford), 129 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,149, at P 23-
24 (2009); Aero Energy, L.L.C., 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,128, at P 39 (2006). 
 275. Under the traditional model, a generator would request the transmission 
provider to interconnect the generator with its facilities, and the transmission 
provider, according to its OATT, would construct the facilities needed to connect 
the renewable generation source to the grid. See generally Standardization of 
Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2003, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,146 (2003); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FERC, 
475 F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  However, the transmission provider may not be 
able to construct the interconnection in time to meet the developer’s needs, or it 
may be too expensive, or the generator may prefer to own the line itself, so 
developers are opting to construct the interconnection themselves. 
 276. See Terra-Gen Dixie Valley, L.L.C., 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, at P 50 n.90 
(2010) (citing SunZia, 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,162, at P 37 (2010); Aero Energy L.L.C., 
116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,149 at P 28). 
 277. See Milford, 129 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,149 at P 23. 
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merchant line to be pre-subscribed in anchor customer 
agreements, and is wrestling with the issue of how much capacity 
must be made available in an open season; furthermore, the 
Commission also requires tradable rights on the secondary 
market for merchant transmission capacity. 
A salient difference between these two scenarios, however, is 
that since the gen-tie line is built to serve the generator’s own 
needs, and not third parties, there is no open season requirement 
or presubscription phase that might help right-size the line at the 
outset.  This matters because as generators build ever longer gen-
tie lines, they come to resemble, superficially at least, merchant 
transmission facilities linking renewable generation resources to 
the grid or other markets.  If the gen-tie line is the only line in a 
certain region, it may raise market power concerns, particularly 
barriers to entry.  This body of precedent, like the merchant 
transmission precedent, is complex and rapidly evolving.  The 
Commission may want to consider harmonizing these two bodies 
of precedent and framework of analyses.278
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Drawing on concepts from its market-based rate program and 
natural gas regulation, as well as economic principles, the 
Commission has found innovative ways to support merchant 
transmission solutions.  In granting applications for negotiated 
rates, the Commission has recognized the financial needs of 
 
 278. Notably, on March 15, 2011, Commission staff held a technical conference 
to explore issues related to merchant transmission and gen-tie lines.  In a two-
panel format, participants expressed their views concerning the appropriate 
balance between open access, undue discrimination, transmission project 
financing and efficient, low-cost interconnection of renewable generation.  The 
merchant (and/or independent) transmission panel focused on the tension 
between allocation of priority rights for use of transmission facilities and open 
access policies.  Among other things, panelists discussed “right-sizing” projects, 
open seasons, and the need for flexibility in anchor shipper arrangements.  The 
gen-tie line panel discussed the application of the Commission’s open access 
policies to gen-tie lines when third-parties seek to use their facilities. See 
Supplemental Notice of Technical Conference re Priority Rights to New 
Participant Funded Transmission, Docket No. AD11-11-000 (Mar. 7, 2011).  The 
technical conference was webcast, and staff announced at the technical 
conference that a supplemental notice will provide the deadline and details for 
filing post-technical conference comments with the Commission. 
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merchants, while honoring the Commission’s statutory obligation 
to ensure that rates, terms and conditions of transmission service 
are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.  The 
Commission has demonstrated flexibility in its analysis, and will 
no doubt continue to refine its approach, as the landscape for 
transmission and generation, particularly renewable resources, 
continues to change.279
 
 
 
 279. For an engaging and provocative discussion of the future of the American 
electricity industry, including the transmission grid, see generally Fox-Penner, 
supra note 4.  As the author opines, “the economic and regulatory structure of 
the American power industry is a contraption only a lawyer could love.” Id. at 
10. 
59
